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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On June 16th, 2009, the Oregon legislature passed a bill that would give citizen
deliberation a unique role in the state's initiative process. The Citizens' Initiative Review
gives deliberative citizen panels a new page in the voters' pamphlet to publish statements
for and against state-wide ballot measures in the 2010 election cycle. This process is
completely unique to Oregon, and aims to give voters a trustworthy and impartial source
of information to consider when making their voting choices. The bill represents a huge
opportunity for proponents of deliberation to demonstrate its utility in decision making. It
also raises the question of why Oregon lawmakers chose to adopt this distinctive strategy
for improving the initiative process.
Advocates of deliberative democracy have long tried to convince policy makers
of the many desirable outcomes that could arise from promoting deliberation in broader
society. Despite their efforts, policies that promote ideal-types of deliberation for the
public remain rare. When they do arise, deliberative theorists have been eager to explore
and publicize the fact that true deliberative policy can actually exist. Researchers have
also explored the outcomes of deliberative efforts in attempts to reveal how successful
these processes have been across various social and policy goals. The deliberative
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literature has begun to sketch a picture of what makes deliberative acts successful, and
in what terms that success can be defined. However, there is no empirical literature
telling us when deliberative policy is likely to arise, or why policy makers are
occasionally drawn to support deliberative strategies.
The goal of this research will be to focus on the question of why political elites
choose to endorse deliberative policy. A very recent example of the Oregon State
Legislature endorsing the pilot for a deliberative citizen review process on ballot
initiatives (called the Citizens' Initiative Review) will serve as a case study. By exploring
the reasoning of the Representatives and Senators who supported this deliberative policy,
as well as the political environment surrounding the issue of initiative reform, this
research will shed considerable light on the decision making procedures that lead
politicians to choose deliberation in public policy. This single case is not fully
representative of the many issue areas or institutional environments where deliberative
policy might be proposed, but takes an initial step toward answering broader questions.
At the very least, exploring this case will reveal why policy makers came to
support the Citizens' Initiative Review (CIR) process in Oregon. The issue of initiative
reform is one which many state legislatures are facing as citizens become increasingly
discontented with ballot measures that are confusing to voters, or public debates which
are dominated by special interest groups (Ellis 2002: 194). Legislators are also weary of
ballot measures that have huge impacts on state budgets, yet bypass the normal legislative
process and receive very little deliberative review. The CIR process institutes citizen
panels to review ballot measures and provide statements on the various measures to the
voting public. Depending on its success in Oregon, this strategy of reform may spread to
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other states that use ballot initiatives. This research will reveal what factors were most
important and influential in the policy decision which led to the adoption of Citizens'
Initiative Review.
Beyond issues of initiative reform, this research acts as a window into a broader
field of deliberative policy. Although I will be dealing within the issue area of initiative
reform, the reasoning and insight from this research speaks to broader questions of when
deliberative policy is promoted by policy makers. This information could be invaluable to
both deliberative advocates and policy makers. While the portability of this particular
case is difficult to determine, the important conditions that led to the endorsement of the
CIR by political elites in Oregon might be applied elsewhere. Answering this question
about the CIR in Oregon also allows me to test, and examine the relative influence of
possible explanations that come from deliberative and public policy literature. It is
important to empirically describe this unexplored facet within what is a well developed
theoretical field on deliberative democracy.
Deliberative policies have been utilized by lawmakers in the USA and throughout
the world. They have been applied to a variety of subject areas and levels of government
from local to national. By way of example, city governments in Eugene, Oregon,
Sacramento, California, and Fort Collins, Colorado have used deliberative projects to
engage citizens and create a public will to act, on issues of taxation, providing
community services, and planning city development (Weeks 2000). At the state level
Oregon has used deliberative "watershed councils" to govern the clean-up of its rivers for
years (Smith 2009). More recently Minnesota used citizen deliberation in overseeing and
making recommendations for the recount ofthe 2008 Franken v. Coleman Senate race
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(Weiner 2009). Internationally, highly structured citizen deliberation has been used in
localities across Spain (Font and Blanco 2007), and Brazil has earned a reputation for its
municipal health councils that involve citizens from every class in crafting the nation's
health policy (Pozzoni 2002). While there is an increasing literature on the efficacy and
outcomes of deliberative projects like these, very little empirical work has been done to
see what leads these policies to be endorsed in the first place.
CHAPTER OUTLINE
The following chapters will address the question of how certain political elites
came to support deliberative policies. Chapter two will review the relevant literature that
might be applied to the topic. After describing what deliberation is and how it is
conceptualized by different theorists, the explanations for supporting deliberative policy
will be divided into three broad categories: a political explanation that is based around
mounting political pressures to act and a feeling of obligation or last resort from policy
makers, an ideational explanation wherein political leaders will jump to the idea of
deliberation, actively choosing it as a best policy, and explanations from the public policy
literature will provide a final view of how deliberation might become a successfully
endorsed public policy. The chapter ends with a description of the methodology used for
the case study of CIR, and how I expect to use interviews with political elites to
empirically explore what led to its passage.
Chapter three delves into the case study of CIR in Oregon. It will begin with a
description ofthe CIR and what it entails as a deliberative mechanism. I will then outline
a history leading up to the introduction of CIR to Oregon, and describe the actors
involved in this story. The chapter will then go on to explore the importance of each of
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the ideational and political explanations described in chapter two, before laying out the
four explanations that my research has revealed for the success of CIR in Oregon: timing,
effective advocacy, exceptionalism, and low-impact legislative strategy.
The final chapter seeks to link the literature described in Chapter two to the
results ofthe research described in Chapter three. Chapter four will wrap-up the
investigation of the causes of deliberative policy endorsement by outlining which
literatures have been the most useful in reflecting the policy making processes that I
observed, as well as where my empirical conclusions might fairly be applied in the future.
I conclude with some thoughts on the future of CIR in Oregon and the continued
challenges this deliberative policy will face in maintaining the conditions which led to its
adoption.
6CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
DEFINING DELIBERATION
The need for greater deliberation in modern democracy has been identified by
many political theorists. There is a considerable amount of overlap in definitions for
deliberation, and this section will identify the essential and common characteristics
authors agree on. The definition determined by this section is used to identify what
constitutes 'deliberative policy,' and select the Citizens' Initiative Review (CIR) as the
case study I explore in Chapter 3. There will be some discussion of the areas of
disagreement in the deliberative literature, including whether or not deliberative decisions
should be binding, and what the role of government should be in the process. This is not
intended to be a comprehensive overview of how deliberation has been defined in the
literature. This review will focus on outlining the foundations, and defining
characteristics of the process of deliberation.
One of the touchstone authors for deliberative theory in modern democracy, who
provides a useful groundwork for identifying and defining deliberation, is Jurgen
Habermas. In The Structural Transformation ofthe Public Sphere (English translation
1989), Habermas offers a historical narrative of political culture in early modern Europe.
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Haberrnas (1995) claims that a "public sphere" emerged in seventeenth century France
and Great Britain, where "the fashionable ladies, and nobles associated with sons of
watchmakers and shopkeepers" as free and equal citizens (237). These inclusive public
meetings took place in salons, theatres, and coffeehouses, where people would discuss
society and politics. Everyone was of equal status and was given the chance to interpret
and question political ideas, which the Church and the courts once maintained a
monopoly on (Haberrnas 1995: 239). In this sphere, face-to-face discussion took place in
a shared locale, where there was "no authority beside that of better argument" (Haberrnas
1995: 240). The participants "felt themselves at one with all," and were completely
"willing to let themselves be convinced by [others'] arguments" (Habermas 1995: 240).
Each political group would also publish the opinions that emerged from their discussions,
and a huge network of periodicals and journals emerged to circulate ideas and fuel further
discussions! (Habermas 1979: 200). This public sphere became the site where public
opinion was formed.
Eventually, the public sphere began to decline. With the growth of
industrialization and capitalism, "large [private] organizations and interest groups became
key political partners with the state, which greatly displaced the role of the public"
(Dahlgren 2002: 196). The public sphere continued to weaken as it became "vulnerable
to the repressive and exclusionary effects of unequally distributed social power and
systematically distorted communication" (Habermas 1996: 307-308). As the public
became fragmented, it lost its social coherence and was "reduced to a group of
spectators" (Dahlgren 2002: 196). The power of private interests and the conglomeration
1 According to Habennas (1979), "450 clubs and over 200 journals were established in France in 1848
between February and May alone" (200).
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ofmedia ownership have continued until today, preventing an ideal public sphere from
emerging in modem society. As a result public opinion is little more than the "expression
of an unmediated popular will" without the legitimacy of reasoned and informed
discussion (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 9).
It is clear to Thompson (1995) and others "that this model was regarded by
Habermas as an idealization of actual historical processes" (253). In reality, the leisurely
discussion of politics in seventeenth century European coffeehouses were not as inclusive
or diverse as Habermas implies (Thompson 1995: 253). However, the story outlines an
ideal operation for public opinion formation, and explains why it does not currently exist
in society. Deliberative theory following Habermas is largely built around reimagining
and describing forms of public conversation that will achieve the ideals of the public
sphere.
Since Habermas, authors have gone on to clearly describe the assumptions and
aims that deliberation is built around. Benhabib (1996) assumes a few social barriers that
prevent ideal public opinion formation, make democratically legitimate policy decisions
difficult, and that make organized citizen deliberation important to democracy. Benhabib
(1996) writes that: (1) there exist conflicting social interests, (2) that there is a pluralism
of values in society, (3) and finally that no modem society can organize its affairs around
mass assembly (73). Each ofthese factors makes democratic decision making difficult,
and deliberation presents a procedural solution for dealing with them. Deliberative theory
describes how the requirements of deliberation can result in more legitimate and
representative decisions, to overcome or offset the effects of each ofthe existing social
limitations Benhabib (1996) outlines.
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The first assumed condition that prevents a legitimate and informed public
opinion from forming is that there exist conflicting interests in society (Benhabib 1996:
73). Habermas points out this challenge clearly, and agrees that conflicting social
interests have contributed to the decline of the public sphere. These conflicting interests
prevent coherent public opinion from emerging as each individual only promotes their
personal interests. Legitimate democratic policy making becomes more difficult when
coherent public opinion is replaced by competing interest groups with varying power.
Deliberation addresses this problem for democratic legitimacy by "encouraging
public-spirited perspectives on public issues" (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 10). As in
Habermas's public sphere, deliberation requires free and equal participation, where no
person's view is privileged above others or excluded outright. In this environment,
participants must use reason to convince others of their viewpoint. As a result, the
conversation becomes increasingly conscious of public interests and the greater good. In
Benhabib's (1996) words,
When presenting their point of view and position to others, individuals must
support them by articulating good reasons in a public context to their co-
deliberators. This process of articulating good reasons in public forces the
individual to think of what would count as a good reason for all others involved
(71-72).
Deliberation also includes the requirements of inclusivity and reasoned argument in order
to deal with the conflicting interests that exist in society. When deliberation is ideal, the
perspectives that emerge are public-minded, because they have been vetted by equal
individuals with diverse interests.
A second social condition that Benhabib (1996) outlines, which may hamper
democratic decision making, is that there is a pluralism of values in society (73). Separate
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from people's personal interests, there are legitimate conflicts in values, stemming
from moral or religions differences. Benhabib (1996) acknowledges that society can not
have a "strong unified moral code" without "forsaking fundamental liberties" (73). This
presents a challenge to democratic decision making because there are certain issues
where consensus can not occur. Fighting, contestation, and polarization may emerge as a
result.
Even in its ideal form, deliberation can not produce moral consensus, but it can
help to alleviate the democratic dilemmas arising from pluralism (Elster 1998). As
Gutmann and Thompson (2004) describe,
Deliberation can not make incompatible values compatible, but it can help
participants recognize the moral merit of their opponents' claims when those
claims have merit. It can also help deliberators distinguish those disagreements
that arise from genuinely incompatible values from those that can be more
resolvable than they first appear (11).
Deliberation aims to address conflicting moral values by "promoting a mutually
respectful process of decision making" (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 11). By
talking and reasoning with moral opponents, opposing sides will acknowledge the
merit of the other side's argument, allowing them to maintain mutual respect, and
a working relationship. By promoting respect and understanding among opposing
factions of society, deliberation makes policy outcomes and democratic decisions
more acceptable to everyone.
A third social barrier to ideal public opinion formation, is that no modem society
can organize its affairs around mass assembly, or direct democracy (Benhabib 1996: 72-
73). Practical and procedural challenges prevent all citizens from being able to debate and
vote on every issue which arises. Benhabib (1996) also points out that once a
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deliberative body reaches some invisible size limit, the nature and quality ofthe
reasoning process is affected (73). Already by electing representatives, the democratic
will of the people is being diluted, and the legitimacy of elected officials' decisions may
be questioned.
Deliberation amongst citizens whose views will infonn actual decision makers,
strikes a balance between representative and direct democracy. Because of its
requirements of inclusivity, equality, and reason, deliberation is promoted as the most
legitimate fonn of collective decision making. The decisions of public officials will be
perceived as more democratic and acceptable when "everyone's claims have been
considered on the merits, rather than on the basis of a party's bargaining power"
(Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 10). Deliberation promotes legitimacy because it
includes careful consideration of all opposing views (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 10).
Even those who may disagree with a decision can accept the legitimacy of the process
through which it was reached. Moreover, the ideal deliberative model does not require a
single general assembly of citizens because it is through pluralist interlocking "networks
and associations of deliberation, contestation and argumentation" that a collective "public
conversation results" (Benhabib 1996: 73-74). Similar to the public sphere, each location
of deliberative interaction is limited, but they will interact and share membership to
create a collective conversation.
A final aim of deliberation is to advance collective understanding in order to
correct or avoid policy mistakes (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 12). By encouraging
conversation with others, deliberation advances understanding of issues and alternative
viewpoints among participants. Presuming to know the best policy answer before hearing
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from others leads to poorly justified choices and policy mistakes (Gutmann and
Thompson 2004: 12). Gastil et al. (2007) have shown cases where polls show a
discrepancy between public opinion and votes cast, because people do not understand the
complexity or wording of an issue, or do not fully understand the consequences of a
decision. As a result they vote haphazardly, and sometimes in opposition to their own
values (Gasti1 et al. 2007: 1439). A major systematic finding ofmodem public opinion
literature has been that most people do not understand any of the major issues around
them, have incoherent preferences, and can be induced to vote in almost any direction by
small wording changes (Converse 1964} Beierle and Cayford (2002) have done
empirical studies that conclude deliberation among citizens will not only inform the
public, but also improve the substantive quality of decisions made. Macedo (1999) also
claims that, by virtue of being a fair process which promotes feelings oflegitimacy,
deliberation can promote better policy outcomes over time, because citizens who
understand and accept some policy will enforce and abide by it appropriately (10).
Deliberation is a procedure that claims to produce objectively better policy outcomes, as
well as being thoroughly democratic in its opinion formation.
Deliberative theory has paid special attention to the importance of deliberation in
the functioning of democracy, giving rise to the term' deliberative democracy'. The two
terms deliberation and deliberative democracy will both be used to describe public
policies throughout this research. The distinction to keep in mind is that deliberation is a
procedure which includes a diversity of citizens in a reasoned, rational and impartial face-
to-face debate, and deliberative democracy is a system that uses deliberation to make the
entire democratic process and all decision making procedures more legitimate. Both can
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be used to promote social coherence, and deal with moral disagreement. Public policies
can be designed to reflect deliberative ideals, as well as promote deliberative democracy.
The theoretical ideals of deliberation are difficult to attain and do not typically
exist in broader society. However, there have been a number of deliberative projects that
demonstrated these ideals can exist in carefully constructed and well mediated
environments (Crosby 1995). Armour (1995) writes that "if care is taken in the
structuring" and in the selection of participants, then deliberation "represents an
improvement over more traditional forms of public involvement in policy making" (186).
Crosby (1995) has run numerous deliberative projects at the national and state level and
evaluations from participants and observers have always ranked the process' impartiality
and integrity highly (164). A number of other organizations (America Speaks, National
Issues Forum, National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation, and others) have also
organized and run local and national deliberative projects, in the USA and abroad, often
focusing citizens' conversations on a specific issue (Jefferson Center 2009b). Although
many deliberative mechanisms for obtaining a more meaningful public opinion have been
developed, institutionalized deliberative public policy remains rare (Reitman 2010).
For the purposes of this research, a policy should reflect the values, assumptions,
and aims discussed above in order to be identified as deliberative. It is impossible for a
single policy to shape the whole of society and establish a deliberative public sphere the
way Habermas, and other deliberative theorists describe the ideal. However, any policy
that aims to include a diverse sample ofcitizens in a reasoned, rational and impartial
debate over some political problem in a face-to:face environment can be called
deliberative. The process should aim to improve legitimacy of decision making, promote
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the public interest, promote respect among morally opposed participants and produce
better policy outcomes. Deliberative theory is called a proceduralist theory, because the
success of deliberation depends on the institutionalization of the procedures and
conditions of communication (Benhabib 1996: 73, Habennas 1996: 27). Thus
deliberative policies are defined by the procedures that govern discussions, such as
inclusivity, reasoned debate, and equality of participants.
Many government efforts to include public opinion in policy making procedures,
such as town hall meetings or community forums, will be excluded from the strict
definition of deliberative policies in this project. In order to be deliberative, a process
must include a selection process for participants that aims to include diversity, and a
discussion environment where people will listen and speak in tum to reason with one
another. It can not be only an airing of views, or a series of questions aimed at an
individual or group. There should be rational argument offered by and to participants,
with a reasonable expectation that people's preferences will change as a result of the
conversation (Elster 1998: 8). Considerable attention must also be paid to keeping
interactions "free from domination (the exercise of power), strategizing by the actors
involved, and (self-) deception" (Dryzek 1990: 15). In ideal deliberation, there is no
authority influencing people's views, other than the authority of better argument (Dryzek
1990: 15).
DIVISION IN THE LITERATURE
The definition for deliberation previously discussed will guide and infonn the
remainder of this project. However, there are some aspects of deliberation where authors
continue to disagree. Whether or not deliberative outcomes should be binding, what role
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government should play in facilitating deliberation, and if deliberation is truly
democratic are three areas of contention that will be discussed below. These different
conceptions in the literature are also reflected in the different conceptions that policy
makers might have of deliberation. These divisions will speak to the reasoning of why
politicians will choose to support, or not to support, deliberative policies.
There is disagreement in the literature as to whether the conclusions reached from
deliberation need to be legally binding in order to be an effective democratic mechanism.
Gutmann and Thompson (2004) have argued yes, in deliberative democracy the decisions
from deliberation must be binding for some time (5). Others agree that "the state must
cede some of its power in order to give authority to a process" (Smith 2009: 22).
Empirical research has shown that the more binding influence a deliberative process
stands to have on policy outcomes, the more successful the process will be (Beierle and
Cayford 2002:50-51). Other authors have taken a more measured view of the influence of
deliberation, and insist that the government should always retain final authorization of
policy (Wright 1995,259). In their view, deliberation should have influence through the
normal democratic process, whereby the public expresses its will, and elected leaders will
listen. The way that Habermas (1996) conceptualizes deliberation is about the formation
of a democratic public opinion rather than final decision making (27). He would place
deliberative outcomes in a non-binding category, although he warns that a legislature
would be seen as illegitimate and undemocratic if it did not listen to the will of the people
emanating from the public sphere. The view authors take may also be the result of how
they envision the operation of public deliberation. Since Habermas' deliberation is not a
formal proceeding, and is more a nebulous and ongoing process, in which it makes sense
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that decision making will continue to rely on leaders for decisions at any given time.
However, if deliberation is a strictly organized undertaking that aims to serve a particular
purpose, or speak to a specific problem, then its outcome should be binding for it to have
the greatest effect (Beierle and Cayford 2002).
The role that the government should play in deliberation is another source of
disagreement in the literature. Habermas's vision is that deliberation develops
spontaneously and within the public (Habermas, 1996; 307). He admits that formally
institutionalizing a public sphere through legislative endorsement can make it less
vulnerable, but also warns it may become more restricted (Habermas, 1996; 307-308).
For Habermas (1996), the role ofthe government is to listen and respond to the public
opinion arising from deliberation:
The legislative branch of government would destroy the basis of its own rational
functioning if it were to block up the spontaneous sources of autonomous public
spheres or shut itself off from the input of free-flowing issues, contributions,
information, and arguments circulating in a civil society set apart from the state
(183-184).
Other authors have advocated the government take a more active role in ensuring the
integrity of deliberative processes. Wright (1995) says, "the role of government is to staff
the deliberation, set broad requirements of inclusion, ensure the integrity ofthe process,
and authorize the strategy conceived" (259). Welsh (2000) insists that "legislation
authorizing participatory policy dialogue" is a primary feature of ideal deliberative
democracy (19). Many others agree that the role ofthe state in deliberation is to give
some minimum governing standards to the process (Smith 2009: 22). In this view, the
government must provide the oversight to maintain an ideal deliberative environment,
t
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which does not exist independently in modem society because of conflicting social
interests, and pluralism of values.
While there is a "near consensus among democratic theorists on behalf of
deliberation," there are some authors who write against deliberation (Saunders 1997).
Bohman (2003) believes that the requirement of rationality in deliberation makes it
intolerant and undemocratic. Bohman (2003) points out that by requiring "reason" in
argument, deliberation will automatically exclude those people whose arguments are not
interpreted as reasonable by a group (773). He goes on to say, "what counts as a reason
and a justification has changed," and, "we do not know in advance which claims or group
perspectives count as reasons" (773). On these grounds, he worries that deliberation is
inherently excluding certain views that are not currently recognized as legitimate by
collective understanding, but at different points in time could be considered rational.
Sanders (1997) is also suspicious of deliberation as a democratic concept. To
begin with he writes that "the wide endorsement of deliberation by democratic theorists
has not emerged through a genuinely deliberative process," meaning that "deliberation
might not appeal to ordinary citizens" (347-348). Sanders (1997) argues that most
citizens are not engaged and rational, and they may actually prefer to be ruled by experts,
rather than being asked to deliberate. Additionally, the requirement of equality in
deliberation is not realistic "because the material prerequisites for deliberation are
unequally distributed" and "no matter how worthy their presentations actually are, some
people are more likely to be persuasive than others, and some people are more likely to
be disregarded" (Saunders 1997: 349). For these reasons, Saunders suggests, deliberation
is not the "moral solution to vexing political problems" that it is often presented as (347).
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The objections of Bohman and Sanders are important to consider, but they remain the
minority views ofdemocratic and deliberative theorists.
CHOOSING DELIBERATIVE POLICY
The previous section has described what deliberation is and what the goals of that
process are, but it does not speak directly to the research question of why and how people
come to support deliberative policies. Why do public officials occasionally make a
concerted effort to include deliberative public discussions in decision making? There is
virtually no empirical work directed at answering this question. The literature I will
review to begin with is mostly theoretical explanations for why deliberative policies
might find success. I will go on to explore public policy literature that has described in
broader terms how proposed ideas find legislative success, and tie these theories into the
endorsement of deliberative policies like the Citizens' Initiative Review.
The choice of deliberation might be broadly explained as either primarily a
political decision that policy makers are pressured into making, or as a more ideational
decision to pursue policy they believe will achieve valuable goals. The first perspective,
that deliberation is used as a last resort when there are few other politically viable choices
for policy-makers, will be referred to as the political explanation. The alternative view is
that policy makers are independently reform-minded and wish to increase procedural
legitimacy in democratic procedures. This view will be called the ideational explanation
because it assumes that lawmakers are jumping to an idea rather than being forced into it.
The following section will explore these explanations in the deliberative literature, and
how they might be recognized empirically. Political and ideological categories of
explanation are not stated as explicitly in the literature as I will describe them. I have
19
created these categories in order to organize the current range of answers that exist for
this question. The hope is also to create a differentiation that can give structure to the
interpretation of my research outcomes. These explanatory categories are ideal-type
explanations for the endorsement of deliberation. They do not exist in the reality of
policy making perfectly independent from one another. This section will describe and
identify them both so that research can indentify the relative influence of each on the
decisions of political elites.
A third explanation for the choice of deliberation from the deliberative literature
claims that certain cultures are more favorable for the use of deliberation than others. I
will briefly describe this cultural explanation; however it is not within the scope of this
research to test and make observations that pertain to this theory, as there is no cultural
variation in the case study I am exploring.
Lastly, public policy literature has provided a few theories for how ideas become
enacted as policy. These explanations are less focused on the decision procedures of
individuals than the other explanations outlined. Instead they describe the processes in
broader society, and the political environment that lead up to the adoption of some policy.
These theories outline an array of forces that influence agendas in the policy making
world, and which might overlay with political or ideational influences to create a better
picture of exactly what led a deliberative policy to gain the support it needed to become a
law.
Political Explanation
The first common kind of explanation for the use of deliberation can be called a
"political explanation," and points to political expedience as the root cause of moves in a
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deliberative direction. Authors who describe this explanation see deliberation being
undertaken where there is considerable political pressure to act, and more traditional
forms of policy making have failed or proven too politically difficult. Weeks (2000)
describes "the dysfunctional political process" as often resulting in a lack of political will
for politicians to take necessary actions (363). This argument assumes that politicians
will want to avoid difficult policy choices that might put their jobs at risk at election time.
In this view, deliberation is turned to as a way of getting citizens to both understand the
problem, and make difficult decisions viable for policy makers who face incentives that
make certain policy actions difficult.
Weeks (2000) describes the actions of two city councils in Eugene, Oregon and
Sacramento, California as an example of actors choosing to utilize deliberation for
political reasons. In these cases, city revenues failed to meet the costs of providing
municipal services. Both city councils "deferred corrective action in favor of less painful
temporary fixes," but long-term forecasting revealed an increasing gap between revenues
and the cost of public services (Weeks, 2000; 363). Politicians had failed to be forthright
in council elections about either raising revenues or cutting costs. City management was
forced to conclude that a more lasting solution was needed, and turned to deliberative
projects for strategies that would produce public input and, more importantly, public
support (Weeks, 2000; 363). This account of choosing deliberation is a classic last resort
scenario. Politicians, who were unwilling to make difficult political decisions, turned to
citizen deliberation to inform the public of the dilemma they faced, and legitimize their
eventual policy actions. For their part, citizens are engaged in deliberation are expected to
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adopt more long-tenn, public-minded perspectives on issues than politicians facing
elections would take.
One variant of a political explanation is R. Kent Weaver's (1986) theory of
blame-avoidance. Weaver (1986) describes politicians as "primarily motivated by the
desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather that by seeking to claim credit for
popular ones" (371). In actions that he describes as "blame avoidance," Weaver (1986)
claims that politicians will use any number of strategies to avoid upsetting an audience of
voters. Among these avoidance strategies is redefining an issue so that they might create
new policy options to deal with some problem (Weaver 1986: 384). Ifthe existing
solution to some issue may create a perceived loss to the public, deliberative procedures
might be introduced as a policy alternative that is not costly to voters. Blame avoidance
may lead policy alternatives like deliberation to be chosen when they might otherwise fail
(393). Additionally, politicians may include citizen deliberation in decision making
procedures as a way of "passing the buck," and shifting the site of a decision elsewhere
when a policy is controversial (Weaver 1986: 384-385). Weaver's theory is especially
relevant to my case study since initiative refonn is an area where political forces from the
both the left and right, and public opinion, has made it difficult to make meaningful
changes in the past. It is possible that policy makers may have endorsed deliberation
because they felt compelled to show action and thought deliberation would not upset
anyone, but my case study will reveal some political actors showed a willingness to also
endorse less popular initiative refonn proposals, which does not reflect blame avoidance.
E. E. Schattschneider (1960) also believes that the audience has a strong bearing
on political behaviors, and provides another variant of a political explanation. In
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Schattschneider's (1960) explanation of political decisions, he describes the "scope of
conflict," or how many outsiders are brought into some policy fight, as a strategic
calculation made by the parties involved to bring power and favor to their side (7).
Schattschneider asserts that "the audience of a fight has more bearing on the outcome
than those involved in the fIght themselves" (2). As a result, "when one side [of a
conflict] is hard pressed, the impulse to redress the balance by inviting in outsiders is
irresistible" (15). We can interpret the choice to use public deliberation as a way of
"socializing" conflict on the part of one side who sees themselves benefitting from
bringing in an audience on an issue. This possible explanation for the use of deliberation
is within the political category of explanations because it describes the choice of
deliberation as purely a political attempt to bring more supporters into the fray and
redress the balance of power (Schattschneider 1960: 15). Unfortunately, for the case of
erR, citizen deliberation is not actually changing the site where a decision is being made
since citizens' views are only being brought into bear on ballot measures. Socializing
conflict in this case will not apply well.
Some authors have identified the same conditions that make political decisions
particularly difficult as leading to the adoption of deliberative policies. Dryzek (1990)
writes that when there are many groups with similar power who are all influencing the
policy making process, this can lead politicians to seek deliberation. Fung and Wright
(2003) claim that if there are few alternative solutions being discussed for a problem, this
may lead to the choice of deliberation. Both facing a diversity of groups with similar
power on different sides of an issue, and having few policy alternatives available, would
be political explanations for the use of deliberation since the dominant reasoning for
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choosing deliberation is that they are facing political pressure from diverse groups and
feel unable to decide between the few policy alternatives available. When the case study
is examined, it will be difficult to apply these explanations to the issue area of initiative
reform, but it is clear that the legislators who endorsed the deliberative policy in question
faced a wide variety of alternative solutions on the topic, not few as Fung and Wright
(2003) predict.
Whenever political actors are choosing deliberation out of necessity, or a
perceived political gain, this would constitute a political explanation. Under this
explanation, the primary reason for implementing deliberative procedures will be the
result of an opportunity to avoid blame, or gain political traction by including the public.
When conditions are present that make political decisions difficult, we may interpret the
endorsement of deliberation as a primarily political act that has taken place because more
common forms of policy were unviable. What Weeks would describe as "political
dysfunction," results in citizens being brought into a process.
Ideational Explanation
A second kind of explanation for the support of deliberation could be called,
"ideational." According to this view, policy makers will choose deliberation because they
see it as a good policy to deal with a problem they are facing, or achieve some goals they
find desirable. Policy actors should perceive certain benefits arising from the use of
deliberation, such as the increased legitimacy and improved quality of democracy
claimed by deliberative advocates, and they will choose deliberation as a best policy
without the demands of political pressure. Many authors have described the benefits of
deliberation, both theoretically and empirically. If these claims are convincing to policy
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makers, we should see them jumping to, and implementing, the idea of deliberation
wherever those positive outcomes described by deliberative advocates are highly
desirable solutions to a problem. Under this explanation, political elites will want to
implement deliberative policy because they believe it will normatively add to the
legitimacy of a process, and not because they think deliberative outcomes will personally
benefit them or their interests.
This explanation is based in the procedures and the purported outcomes from
deliberation that are described in deliberative literature. Depending on what some
politician aims to achieve, they may be drawn to different benefits that deliberation can
produce. Many authors have described how deliberation leads to greater democratic
legitimacy since a greater diversity ofviewpoints are heard and considered, and decisions
will be better understood and respected by all (Kymlicka, 2002; 291). Beierle and
Cayford2 (2002) have shown that including public participation in a decision making
process usually increases the public's trust in the "competence and fiduciary duty" of
government institutions (30). In addition, the inclusivity of deliberation is said to promote
public mindedness and increase the respect among competing interests (Gutmann and
Thompson 2004). Deliberation also addresses perceived problems with existing political
processes stemming from interest group dominance in the framing of the public
discussion, the lack of accountability in a process, or the media's neglect of minority
viewpoints (Healthy Democracy Oregon, 2009). Deliberation has the potential to promote
greater unity and solidarity in society because people have shared a discursive experience
2 Beierle and Cayford (2002) conducted an extensive empirical study on the outcomes of public
participation. Their definition of public participation was fairly broad, and included both deliberation and a
number of other less intensive forms of public input. A process's success on social goals was highly
correlated with the quality of deliberation which took place (53).
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and communicated in a non-coercive and respectful way (KYmlicka, 2002; 291). It
should give decision makers a better chance to identify and incorporate public values in
policies (Beierle and Cayford 2002: 23). Also, where moneyed and powerful interests
dominate the public debate, deliberation presents an opportunity to challenge the existing
distributions of power and influence in society (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 16).
That is not all that deliberation claims to accomplish. The act of inclusive,
objective discussion should also increase the knowledge and understanding of an issue
among its participants (Welsh 2000: 19). Beierle and Cayford (2002) write that
deliberative processes have a significant impact on informing and educating the public.
Even when dealing with "quite technical and socially complex" issues "participants
consistently learned a great deal and thus were able to provide insightful policy
recommendations" (Beierle and Cayford 2002: 31). Where policy makers perceive the
apathetic or uninformed public as a problem, deliberative policy may be adopted as a
solution. Finally, there is the view that the fairness of deliberation will not only increase
legitimacy, but will improve the quality of policy outcomes (Macedo 1999: 10). Beierle
and Cayford (2002) agree that the information sharing and respect among those who may
be morally opposed, which deliberation promotes, will result in substantively better
quality decisions. In the ideational explanation, where a politician or political actor aims
to achieve any or all of the goals described they will choose to endorse deliberative
policy.
If a political actor knows about the potential benefits of deliberation, and believes
that they will occur, this would give them a significant reason to support and adopt
deliberative policy. In the ideational explanation, a politician should believe that at least
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some of the outcomes described by deliberative advocates are true, and that they are
desirable to solve some existing political problem. In this way, they adopt the idea of
deliberation because they believe it will be good public policy, and not as a result of
previous failures or mounting political pressures. Many of the statements collected for
my case study reveal that the benefits of deliberation outlined in the literature are
commonly referred to as reasons for wanting more deliberation among law makers.
However, these ideational reasons are present along with other more influential factors
that political elites site as determining their decisions. In this way ideational explanations
are present but not sufficient for describing why deliberation is endorsed.
In the realities of policy making, neither of these two explanations exists in
isolation from one another. My research is likely to reveal both political and ideational
influences working at the same time and to different degrees in describing why policy
makers endorse deliberation. This research wi11labor to explore the relative influences of
both, with the ultimate goal being to describe how each influence is important, and why
one is perhaps more important than the other. A thorough investigation of my case study
will allow for the support and expansion of these existing explanations, as well as the
possibility of observing influences the literature does not yet describe. My aim is to
explain the actual reasoning for the endorsement of deliberative policies within the case I
am exploring, and use this as a frame through which to view a broader story about when
and why deliberation emerges in policy making.
Cultural Explanation
A third and final explanation for the use of deliberation, which I will not attempt
to assess in my research, is the cultural explanation. The idea here is that there might be
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something societal, rather than political or ideational, which leads to the adoption of
deliberation. Some cultural attitudes may prove disastrous for deliberative outcomes, and
therefore the society will neither value or desire deliberative procedures in policy
(Gambetta, 1998; 20). Gambetta (1998) describes the culture in some countries as being
confrontational and argument based, where "admitting to ignorance in any issue area is
paramount to admitting ignorance as a whole" (23). He describes these as "behavioral
conditions" that prevent ideal deliberation, because a free and equal exchange of ideas is
unlikely (Garnbetta, 1998; 20). Gambetta's ideas can be expanded to cover expectations
in a culture as well. If a society has a history and an expectation of public participation in
government, they might demand and receive more deliberative procedures in policy
making. In contrast, a society that puts a higher value on authority, and has no cultural
expectation to be included in policy should experience fewer deliberative efforts.
This explanation mostly attempts to explain international discrepancies in the
utilization and success of deliberative policies. There is no variation in the cultures that
choose deliberative policies in my research so I will not attempt to test, or identify the
influence of this explanation. However, it would be useful to keep this explanation in
mind when comparing cross-cultural examples of deliberation. The reader may also note
the alleged influence of history on deliberation, and the notion that if deliberation has
been used successfully in the past this may make it a more likely policy choice in the
future.
Theories from Public Policy
Public policy literature provides some broad theories for how ideas will rise to the
attention of policy makers and sometimes become enacted as policy. Many ofthe modern
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theories are constructed in opposition to incrementalism, which sees policy happening
in small gradual steps, and rational choice theory, wherein individuals act in order to
achieve clearly defined goals at the least cost (Kingdon 1984). This section will describe
a few theories from policy authors including Kingdon (1984), Baumgartner and Jones
(1993), Skocpol (1992) and Tarrow (1998) to explore how they describe the formation of
policy and what they might contribute to our understanding of what is impacting political
elites' decisions to support deliberation.
John Kingdon (1984) wrote about how policy changes, and agendas are formed.
Kingdon launched his theory from the "garbage can model of organizational choice"
which suggested that problems and solutions exist independently of each other and are
chaotically paired together as time, participants, and opportunity allows (Cohen et al
1972). Kingdon expands on the garbage can model to describe streams of problem
recognition, policy formation and political climate merging to produce new policies.
Kingdon argues that policy does not happen incrementally, and that policy formation can
not be described in neat and rational steps as rational choice theory describes. Rather,
policy making is a dynamic system of changing problems, political climates and
proposed policies. Once a problem and proposal are paired, a "policy window" must
open, and "policy entrepreneurs" will have an opportunity to promote and pass their
proposals (Kingdon 1984,213). Windows might open from swings in national mood,
vigorous lobbying, or some focusing event which brings an issue suddenly to the fore.
According to Kingdon (1984), "advocates of pet proposals watch for developments in the
political stream that they can take advantage of, or try to couple their solution to whatever
problems are floating by at the moment" (213).
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Kingdon (1984) also describes policy entrepreneurs as central actors in
advocating for policy proposals:
They write papers, give testimony, hold hearings, try to get press coverage, and
meet endlessly with important and not-so-import and people. They float their
ideas as trial balloons, get reactions, revise their proposals in the light of
reactions, and float them again. They aim to soften up the mass public,
specialized publics, and the policy community itself. The process takes years of
effort (214).
This description is extremely useful for describing the efficacy of advocates for the CIR.
This part of Kingdon's theory, which emphasizes the importance of devoted efforts from
policy entrepreneurs features centrally in the case I will explore.
Within Kingdon's (1984) model, a deliberative Citizens' Initiative Review would
be characterized as a solution floating in the "policy formation stream". In order to gain
support and success, policy entrepreneurs will pair this deliberative solution to a problem
present in the problem stream. If advocates invest sufficient resources into pushing for
deliberation as a policy solution, and the political climate favors them, their proposal
might be enacted. In Kingdon's theory, the way for deliberation to gain legislative
support is for an entrepreneur, who has coupled deliberation to a problem, to effectively
promote their proposal in a favorable political climate. If anyone of these factors is
missing, the deliberative policy will never gain sufficient support. Kingdon sees policy
changes relying centrally on effective advocacy and the favorable situation of problems,
solutions, and political climate, making it fall under the political category of explanation.
In the case of CIR, we will see the advocacy of policy entrepreneurs being critically
important for the bill. Timing also plays a considerable role in the fortunes ofthe
legislation, which is reflective of Kingdon's policy streams and policy windows.
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Baumgartner and Jones (1993) set out to explain both the stability and the
occasional volatility of policy making in American politics. They agree with Kingdon
that incrementalism is unable to adequately account for the periods of dramatic policy
change that they observe in many issue areas. In their theory of how agendas change,
they describe eras of stability, when policies do not change and the attention paid to an
issue area in the media and in congress is minimal. These periods of balance will be
punctuated by bursts of policy activity brought about when the popular understanding of
an issue has shifted, and it suddenly rises onto the congressional agenda (6). This model
of "punctuated equilibrium" (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 1) is reflective of Kingdon
(1984) in the way issues have to gather momentum before dramatic policy changes will
occur in a window of opportunity. However, Baumgartner and Jones are writing about
continental shifts in national policy so their theory will not apply well to the case of
initiative reform in Oregon r research.
Skocpol (1992) writes about the welfare state in the USA, and has argued broadly
that state structures and state capacities have a significant impact on shaping policy.
Observations of deliberative policies being more or less successful in different state
structures, or emerging in governing environments that have certain institutional qualities
would support Skocpol's assertion. When r describe the history of my case study, it will
be clear that the erR moved to seek out a governing structure that fit to the policy.
Melnick (1994) also describes the USA as being made up of many different governing
structures in different states, which serve as venues with different "opportunity points"
for policies. The eIR was able to explore different venues where it might be
implemented, eventually finding an opportunity point in Oregon (Melnick 1994).
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Skocpo1's emphasis on the importance of state structures downp1ays the importance of
ideas, subsuming it into the political camp of explanation.
Another concept that comes from the social movement literature and will be
usefully applied to the case I am researching is "political opportunity structure" (Tarrow
1998). Tarrow (1998) defines political opportunity structure as the circumstances in a
political landscape that "lower the cost of collective action by revealing potential allies
and triggering social networks," which can lead to the emergence of "contentious
politics" (20). Political opportunities are not really structures but rather situations that
"may ultimately lead to sustained interactions with authorities and social movements"
(Tarrow 1998: 20). When these "external resources" exist for a group, social movements
become much more likely to emerge (Tarrow 1998: 20). If Tarrow's opportunity
structures are applied to deliberative policy there will be conditions arising in the area of
initiative reform that provide significant opportunities for those interested in change to
organize. The cost for someone to endorse a deliberative policy will be reduced, and thus
support for deliberation will grow. Tarrow's political opportunities are similar to
Kingdon's "policy windows," but whereas Kingdon's description focuses on a political
space where problems and solutions will merge, Tarrow describes the social environment
that may lead to social movements, but which may also usefully speak to how policies
emerge. As we will see, both Kingdon's policy windows and Tarrow's political
opportunity structures could be used to describe the social and political environment that
CIR encountered in 2009. The favorable conditions, which could be broadly revered to as
timing, that policy entrepreneurs found themselves in surrounding initiative reform
represent a significant explanation for their bill's legislative success. This aspect of
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Tarrow's theory, which focuses on the influence of social conditions which present
opportunities for change, is another variant of a political explanation.
There is an additional component ofpolitical opportunity structures that Tarrow
(1998) writes about concerning "collective action frames that justify, dignify and animate
collective action" (21). This aspect ofpolitical opportunity involves "consensus
mobilization," and Tarrow argues that the wayan issue is framed produces a shared
meaning in the cultural discourse that relates to "the generalization of a grievance, and
defines the "us" and "them" in a movement's conflict structure" (21). As a factor
contributing to the success of a particular policy, the framing of an issue area would
detennine the terms of debate within which legitimate arguments for and against an idea
can be drawn. This is a highly ideational conceptualization of what makes political
support and opposition possible. If issue areas indeed have collective meanings and
ideological frameworks that limit the policies that are possible, then eIR must fit into that
framework to gain support. The exceptional aims that eIR legislation adopted made the
proposal fit into the collective frame surrounding initiative refonn and do so in a way that
galvanized supporters and made vocal opposition difficult.
This review ofliterature has defined deliberation and described some existing
explanations for why political elites might choose deliberative policies. The foundations,
assumptions and aims of deliberation were outlined, and disagreement over the binding
nature of deliberative decisions and the role of government in facilitating deliberation
were discussed. Understanding how deliberation is defined allows for it to be accurately
placed within the policy world, and suggests reasons why policy makers might adopt it. I
reviewed the literature that might be applied to answering my research question.
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Explanations were organized into political and ideational categories. Theories from
public policy and social movement literature were also explored. Theories from the
policy literature are especially relevant to describing my case study, and will be
encompassed in many of the explanations for the passage ofCIR legislation that I roll out
in Chapter 3. Each of these theories has also been broadly described as belonging to
either a political or ideational category of explanation. Building from the existing
literature, my research will empirically expand and contribute to explanations of how and
why deliberative policies find legislative endorsement.
METHODOLOGY
This research will use a qualitative case study approach to explore the chain of
events which lead to the use of deliberation in the initiative process in Oregon. By using a
thick description of a pattern of events, as well as interviews from actors who
participated, I will test existing explanations for the causes of deliberation. This project
will use process tracing to look for influences that inform decisions to pursue
deliberation. Semi-structured interviews with political elites who where involved in
supporting a deliberative policy will be heavily relied on for insight and information.
Research will also make use of newspaper accounts, web sites of the organizations
involved, and other promotional materials produced by the actors who were advocating
for this particular deliberative policy. The following section will explain my case
selection and further describe how this research will be carried out.
I have chosen to explore a case which presents a clear effort to include
deliberation in the democratic electoral process. The case involves the efforts of some
deliberative advocates to implement a process of Citizens' Initiative Review for ballot
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measures in Oregon. This is an especially interesting case because it is heavily
informed by another attempt to have deliberation legislatively adopted in Washington
State. This deliberative citizen review process found some legislative success in Oregon,
and is currently being implemented in a trial form. This particular case has never been
studied before and presents unique opportunities to learn about what sort of obstacles are
involved in having deliberative processes implemented by a state legislature, and why
advocates saw success in Oregon after a failure in Washington.
The Citizens' Initiative Review (CIR) process is a devoted attempt to create the
theoretically ideal conditions that deliberative theorists describe. It also reflects the value
of having deliberation endorsed and institutionalized by the government. In this case the
deliberative review process was passed by the Oregon legislature only as a pilot program,
with a sunset clause that sees it expire after a single electoral cycle. The case of CIR can
reveal both the motivations to support, and the possible uncertainty that prompted such a
tentative legislative approach.
The CIR is a relatively unique process that has only been proposed in one other
state where it did not meet with success. However, CIR is aimed at addressing some very
commonly perceived problems with the initiative process. The future ofthe idea in states
across the country relies heavily on the legislative outcomes it experiences in Oregon.
Deliberative advocates look closely to Oregon for strategies and lessons that they can
apply to promoting this and other forms of deliberative policy. This relatively recent case
is extremely important in influencing the future of CIR as a deliberative mechanism
across the country. This research reveals information about the way state lawmakers
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approach deliberative policies, and could have a huge effect on the approach that
advocates take to promoting deliberation in legislatures beyond Oregon.
In collecting data for this project I conducted fifteen semi-structured interviews
with political elites who supported the CIR in Oregon. For a summary of participants in
these interviews see Table 1 (p. 32). Participants were selected because they were listed
as sponsors of the CIR legislation, or they had been recommended to me by others as
important actors in the story of passing the CIR legislation. These participants were
predominantly elected Oregon State Representatives. Others were representatives from
organizations who had been involved in supporting CIRs. These sponsors and supporters
were asked similar, but not identical, open-ended questions about why they supported the
CIR process, and were asked to explain what kind of factors had an influence on their
decision to support the legislation at the time. Their responses will be paired with other
evidence to describe what factor had the most influence on the success of CIR in the
Oregon legislature.
This research will explain why political elites in Oregon came to support the CIR
in large enough numbers to ensure its legislative success in 2009. These explanations will
be able to identify the conditions that would cause political elites elsewhere to support
similar CIR proposals for their own state's initiative process. These conclusions alone are
extremely valuable because there are twenty-three states, and the District of Columbia, in
the USA that have an initiative system. The CIR could potentially be a proposed reform
in any ofthese states, and understanding what contributes to this policy's success would
be valuable for deliberative advocates to understand. Ultimately, what this research hopes
to be able to explain is why political elites anywhere would support any deliberative
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policy. With only one case study, its power to answer this question is limited. None the
less, it will speak to these broader questions of deliberative policy making and begin to
contribute to the answer to this question.
Table 1: Interviews Conducted
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
Ore~on House of Representatives
Name Party City/District Date of Role in HB 2895
interview
Ben Cannon D Portland/46 02/18/10 Chief Sponsor
Chris Garrett D Lake Oswego/38 02/10/10 Sponsor
Mitch Greenlick D Portland/33 01/29/10 Sponsor
Chris Harker D Beaverton/34 02/18/10 Chief Sponsor
Betty Komp D Woodburn/22 03/08/10 Sponsor
Nancy Nathanson* D Eugene/13 02/05/10 Sponsor
Andy Olson R Albany/15 02/18/10 Sponsor
Arnie Roblan D Coos Bay/9 02/25/10 Sponsor, Chairman of
the House Rules
Committee, House
Democratic Leader
Suzanne VanOrman D Hood River/52 02/04/10 Sponsor
Brad Witt D Clatskanie/31 02/10/10 Sponsor
Oregon Senate
Richard Devlin D Tualatin/19 03/02/10 Sponsor, Chairman of
the Senate Rules
Committee, Senate
Democratic Leader
Frank Morse* R Albany/8 03/01/10 Sponsor
State Department
Kate Brown D Portland 03/05/10 Advisor to Healthy
Democracy Oregon
Non-Governmental Organizations
Name Organization Date of Role in HB 2895
interview
Kappy Eaton League ofWomen Voters 01/28/10 Advisor to Healthy
of Oregon Democracy Oregon
Tyrone Reitman Healthy Democracy 02/03/10 Lobbyist
Oregon
*phone interview
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CHAPTER III
THE CITIZENS' INITIATIVE REVIEW IN OREGON
This chapter will explore why certain political elites came to support the
deliberative policy of Citizens' Initiative Reviews in Oregon. The chapter begins by
explaining what a Citizens' Initiative Review is and how the concept made its way to
Oregon. This case ofdeliberative policy has never been studied before and presents many
opportunities to learn about what sort of obstacles are involved in having deliberative
processes enacted by a state legislature and why advocates found success in Oregon after
previous failures. This research draws significantly from original interviews with key
Oregon political actors on the CIR. This primary research leads to the critical analysis of
distinct explanations for what led to the success of CrR.
WHAT IS A CITIZENS' INITIATIVE REVIEW?
A "Citizens' Initiative Review" (CIR) is a deliberative review of a proposed state
ballot measure by randomly selected citizens (Healthy Democracy Oregon 2009). This
form ofdeliberation was invented by political scientist and deliberative advocate Ned
Crosby, and relies heavily on Crosby's "Citizen Jury" process. Since Crosby's
organization, "The Jefferson Center," has trademarked the term "Citizen Jury," the
process in Oregon officially uses the term "citizen panels." These panels do much the
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same as what a courtroom jury does. A panel of 18-24 citizens will learn about, and
deliberate on, one ballot measure for five days. These randomly selected citizens are
balanced by partisan affiliation, residence, gender, ethnicity, and educational attainment,
and are selected from the state's database of registered voters to reflect a microcosm of
the state's demographics (OPB 2008). The panelists are volunteers who are paid the
state's average wage for their time, and reimbursed for any travel expenses (Healthy
Democracy Oregon 2009). They hear from witnesses speaking both against and in favor
of the measure, as well as witnesses giving background information on the issue at hand.
The whole process is run by a neutral moderator, who is professionally trained, and paid
for their services (Healthy Democracy Oregon 2010). At the end of five days the
panelists produce a majority and a dissenting opinion of the measure, which are published
in the state's voters' pamphlet.
The erR attempts to remedy a perceived flaw in the initiative process by
attempting to create ideal deliberative conditions that do not otherwise exist in the
broader political conversation. The intent is that panelists will meet democratic and
deliberative ideals by being well-informed, considering many arguments, discovering the
strengths and weaknesses of each through discussion, and eventually corne to well-
reasoned conclusions. They may grapple with very complex issues in their five-day
session, but their decisions will ultimately be to vote for, against, or remain undecided on
a given ballot measure. Their conclusions will then be presented for the consideration of
the voting public. This statement represents a unique source of information for the public,
distinct from the rhetoric and spin of campaigns and media reports that the public usually
encounters surrounding ballot measures.
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HISTORY OF CIR
The creation of the CIR process was the outcome of a history of deliberative
advocacy by political scientist Ned Crosby. Crosby has a PhD in political science from
the University of Minnesota, but is not an academic affiliated with any university. He
describes himself as "a democratic activist with a small d," and has utilized the
considerable wealth of his family, who were the founders of General Mills two
generations ago, to fund his projects and organizations (Weiner 2009). Crosby has
worked to develop and promote the use of deliberative procedures in policy making for
more than thirty years. This section will explore the history of Crosby's deliberative
efforts, and how the CIR eventually found its way to Oregon.
In 1974, Ned Crosby, along with some civic leaders from Minnesota, founded the
"Jefferson Center" in Minneapolis ~ a nonprofit organization that aimed to "conduct
research and development on new democratic processes" (Jefferson Center 2009a). The
Jefferson Center began conducting what were originally called "citizen committees" on
various issues and candidates and determined these were an effective democratic method.
The term "Citizen Jury" was coined and trademarked by the Jefferson Center so that they
could protect the integrity of the process and prevent its commercialization. Citizen Juries
would randomly select representative samples of citizens to learn and deliberate on a
given public policy issue for a number of days (Jefferson Center 2009a). The CIR process
is a Citizen Jury at its core, and simply has the targeted purpose of dealing with state
ballot measures (Healthy Democracy Oregon 2010).
For a number of years the Jefferson Center, with Crosby at its helm, continued to
promote and sponsor the use of Citizen Juries. Projects were usually funded by the
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Jefferson Center, although sometimes they would share costs with city councils or
other public bodies (universities, counties, school boards etc.) who had requested their
help in running a citizens' jury (Jefferson Center 2009c). In conjunction with the League
ofWomen Voters of Minnesota, they held a successful Citizen Jury examining
candidates for the Minnesota gubernatorial race in 1990. Then in 1992 they teamed with
the League ofWomen Voters in Pennsylvania to conduct a citizen jury on the U.S.
Senate race between Arlen Specter and Lynn Yeakel. The Citizen Jury process began to
draw praise in editorials around the country. However, in May of 1993 the Jefferson
Center suffered a serious setback when the IRS determined their tax-exempt status should
be revoked because some projects had evaluated candidates' stands on issues (Jefferson
Center 2009b). The Center fought the IRS for three years, finally agreeing that they
would no longer conduct Citizen Juries that evaluated political candidates, and in
exchange the IRS would take no penalizing action against them (Jefferson Center 2009b).
The Jefferson Center continued to hold Citizen Juries on topics including the
Clinton health care plan, welfare reform, and other more localized issues for counties and
cities in Minnesota throughout the 1990s (Jefferson Center 2009b). By 2002 however, it
had become clear that interest in the projects that the Jefferson Center offered had waned.
Despite marketing and outreach efforts, it seemed the only projects that attracted follow-
ups or repeat business were those on candidates facing regular elections, which the IRS
had ruled they could no longer conduct (Jefferson Center 2009b). In 2002, The Jefferson
Center closed its office, eliminated its permanent staff, reduced the size of its board, and
limited the center's regular operations to maintaining a website (Jefferson Center 2009b).
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CIR in Washington
Despite the dissolving ofthe Jefferson Center, Crosby continued to search for
sites where the procedures of a Citizen Jury might have a significant impact. In 1997,
Crosby had begun exploring the possibility of having the state sponsor Citizen Juries on
candidates, in order to avoid IRS objections. While exploring this idea with former
colleagues from the Jefferson Center in the state ofWashington in 1999, it was suggested
that Citizen Juries could be particularly useful "to assist voters with making informed
decisions on statewide ballot initiatives" (Citizens' Initiative Review 2007). The idea
may have previously escaped Crosby because Minnesota, where the Jefferson Center was
based, does not have an initiative or referendum process, as Washington and many other
Western states do. At this point, Crosby, together with his wife Patricia Benn, began to
focus their attention on instituting state-sponsored Citizen Juries to review ballot
initiatives in Washington. They coined the term Citizens' Initiative Reviews for these
newly purposed Citizen Juries.
In May of2001, the League of Women Voters of Washington paired with Crosby
and Benn to conduct a Citizen Jury on the Citizens' Initiative Review. Randomly selected
citizens from across the state of Washington spent five days learning about Citizens'
Initiative Reviews, discussing how the state might run them, and eventually voting
overwhelmingly (twenty-four to one) in favor of instituting CIRs in their state (Jim
Rough Show 2002). This somewhat strange, self-referential process was supposed to
introduce the people of Washington to a Citizen Jury and demonstrate the viability of
CIRs in practice. Crosby and Benn had also founded an organization called Healthy
Democracy, to finance their efforts to promote CIR (Healthy Democracy 2009).
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Following the Citizen Jury on CIR, Crosby and Benn attempted to run an initiative
drive, requiring them to gather signatures in order to put a CIR bill on the state ballot for
a public vote (Jim Rough Show 2002). This attempt continued in earnest for years, but
Crosby and Benn's intermittent advocacy from Minnesota failed to gather the signatures
they would need for a statewide ballot measure on CIRs permanent implementation.
In 2005, Crosby and Benn's strategy for implementing a state-sponsored CIR
seemed to have changed from one based on creating a ballot initiative, to utilizing the
traditional legislative process. The CIR idea was presented to, and gained endorsements
from the Washington City/County Management Association and the Association of
Washington Cities. Several legislators from Washington's House of Representatives also
began to express interest in the CIR process (GastiI2006). In May of2006 Crosby and
Benn made a presentation to the House State Government Operations and Accountability
Committee (TriCity Herald 2006), and in January of 2007 the CIR was introduced to the
Washington legislature through HB 1696 (see Appendix A). HB 1696 is thirteen pages
long and outlines the formation of a Citizens' Initiative Review Commission, with
members appointed by the governor, attorney general, and secretary of state, as well as
members taken from former citizen panelists, and panel moderators. The commission
would oversee CIRs to ensure their quality and impartiality, and ensure the funds of the
commission were spent effectively. The bill did not include a funding mechanism, and
would have left that to be determined in the legislative process, but it never came to that.
In spite of its many oflegislative sponsors in the House, HB 1696 failed to receive a
single hearing after being referred to the Committee on State Government and Tribal
Affairs, and eventually died with the expiration ofthe 2007 regular legislative session.
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There are several reasons for the failure ofHB 1696. The bill encountered some
institutional hurdles when the Chairman of the Committee where it would receive its first
hearing changed and it was dropped from the agenda (Reitman 2010). Additionally, the
legislation itself was bulky and complex, and outlined a number of tasks that the
executive branch would need to undertake in forming and maintaining a CIR
Commission. Finally, the bill aimed to be funded by the state, and estimates for the cost
were around $1.5 million every two years (Reitman 2010). Asking all of this for a
relatively unknown citizen review process must not have seemed appealing enough to
state lawmakers to support the bill through the legislative process, due to budgetary
strains in the state of Washington.
CIR in Oregon
Despite the ill-fated fortune of Crosby and Benn's Washington project, their
efforts did not go unnoticed or unrewarded elsewhere. In early 2006, Tyrone Reitman
contacted Elliot Shuford, his former classmate from the Planning, Public Policy and
Management department at the University of Oregon, to explore the idea of promoting
the Citizen's Initiative Review in Oregon (Healthy Democracy Oregon 2010). Reitman
and Shuford were recent graduates who had focused their graduate studies "on methods
of citizen deliberation and democratic reform policies" (Healthy Democracy Oregon
2010). They were not affiliated with any political party, and had no lobbying experience.
The pair approached Crosby and Benn about the possibility of collaborating on a CIR
project in Oregon. Crosby and Benn were working on promoting CIR in Washington at
the time, and had moved to Port Townsend, Washington. Upon multiple meetings with
Reitman and Shuford they agreed to provide funding through the Jefferson Center to start
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Healthy Democracy Oregon. The CrR was given two new champions, and one new
arena to breathe life into the concept.
Reitman and Shuford, with the help of Representative Peter Buckley (D -
Ashland), introduced a crR bill in the Oregon legislature, in 2007's regular legislative
session (see Appendix B). HB 2911 was substantively identical to the bill seen by the
Washington legislature earlier that same year, and it came to meet with the same fate.
After being introduced in the House ofRepresentatives, HB 2911 was sent to the House
Committee on Elections Ethics and Rules where it never received a hearing and died
when the legislative session expired.
Reitman and Shuford were reassured by advisors who told them 2007 had been
"an educational session for the CrR," (Healthy Democracy Oregon 2007) and who saw
HB 2911 as "more of a concept piece" (Eaton 2010). Reitman and Shuford continued to
grow the advisory board ofHealthy Democracy Oregon to include former Secretaries of
State Norma Paulus, a Republican, and Phill Keisling, a Democrat, as well as
experienced representatives from Common Cause and the League ofWomen Voters of
Oregon. They sought strategic advice from legislators who shared their enthusiasm for
initiative reform, and took those recommendations into consideration. It was determined
that there was demand for the CrR to be tested in Oregon, so in September of 2008,
Healthy Democracy Oregon ran a full scale demonstration of the CrR process on ballot
measure 58 to showcase the efficacy ofthe reform (Healthy Democracy Oregon 2010).
Measure 58 was a proposal to limit bilingual education to two years for students whose
first language was not English. The review concluded with nine panelists supporting the
measure, and fourteen writing in opposition. This demonstration took place under the
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observation of the League of Women Voters of Oregon and was quite successful at
raising awareness of the CIR process among legislators. Participants of this first ever
Initiative Review gave the process high marks for impartiality, and many participants
were enthusiastic enough about their experience to lobby their representatives in support
of CIRs. The 2008 demonstration also gave Healthy Democracy Oregon a great
opportunity to produce informational and promotional materials about the CIR.
Newspaper articles outlining on the process and its findings appeared prior to the
November 2008 elections (Hammond 2008; Manning 2008). Later, videos that outlined
the process and praised its potential benefits for the citizens of Oregon were posted to
Healthy Democracy Oregon's website and on YouTube.
When the 2009 regular legislative session began, Reitman and Shuford had a
much shorter and completely revised bill, as well as a roster of twenty-three bipartisan
legislative sponsors from the House and Senate. They had made it their goal to talk to
every member ofthe House and Senate to lobby for CIRs (Reitman 2010). With this
improved legislative interest, HB 2895 (see Appendix C) received its first public hearing
in the House Rules Committee on March 30,2009, where Senator Whitsett (R - Klamath
Falls), Representative Cannon (D - Portland), and Cathy Fantz, a participant from the
CIR demonstration in 2008, joined Reitman and Shuford to speak in the bill's favor. HB
2895 was much shorter than previous CIR legislation had been. Language about the
formation of committees to oversee CIRs had been eliminated, and instead the Secretary
of State would choose a nonprofit organization to perform the CIR on behalf of the state.
Amendments later clarified that the organization chosen would provide for any and all
costs of running the CIR process, and they must not receive funding from political or
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corporate sources. A CIR is estimated by Healthy Democracy Oregon to cost about
$150,000 per ballot measure, with some initial costs being reduced when multiple
reviews are run simultaneously (Healthy Democracy Oregon 2010). The legislation
would also sunset on January 2,2011, after just one election cycle. A Citizen Review
would be perfonned on no more than three ballot measures, and the one-page report that
the Reviews produced would be given a prominent new place in the state voters'
pamphlet (Healthy Democracy Oregon 2010). The bill amounted to a pilot program for
the CIR, not the pennanent institutionalization of the process that had been attempted in
the past. Overall, the idea was designed and presented as a nonthreatening commitment
for lawmakers.
Finally, the CIR process had gained the momentum and support it needed for
legislative success. HB 2895 was passed in the Oregon House and Senate with substantial
majorities, and was signed into law by Governor Kulingoski on June 26,2009. The task
remains for Reitman and Shuford to conduct CIRs for up to three ballot measures in the
2010 election. Another task they are undertaking, as prescribed by HB 2895, is a study
into the usefulness of the Initiative Reviews for participants and voters (Healthy
Democracy Oregon 2010). Healthy Democracy Oregon has secured a grant of$218,000
from the National Science Foundation, and collected a team of university researchers
from around the country to conduct this study.3 Pending the success of 2010's Reviews,
and the outcomes of the research on the process's impact, legislation will be introduced
3 The CIR evaluation will include Professor John Gastil from University of Washington, Mark Henkels
from Western Oregon University and Katherine Cramer Walsh from the University of Wisconsin (Healthy
Democracy Oregon 2009).
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in 2011 to make CIRs a pennanent function of Oregon's initiative process (Reitman
2010).
This long history of efforts to promote deliberative processes and policies
contributes to the story of how CIR found legislative success in Oregon. The interesting
question to explore is what caused political actors to coalesce around HB 2895, and
support this particular deliberative policy? The answer will speak to the prospects of
many proposed deliberative policies, and especially highlight what could make CIR
successful in other states that use the initiative process. Why is it that political elites
emerged to support the CIR in Oregon's 2009 legislative session, while the same idea had
been overlooked or not supported in the past? This research revealed four explanations
for the support ofHB 2895 and the legislative success ofthis deliberative policy. They
are timing, effective advocacy, exceptionalism, and lOW-impact legislative strategy. This
chapter explores the influences of them each, but first examines whether or not these
explanations constitute ideational or political reasoning for supporting CIRs, and which
ofthese broader categories from the deliberative literature is having the greater effect.
DRNEN BY IDEAS?
Initiative refonn has been an important topic of conversation for the Oregon
legislature for several years, and the State Representatives I spoke to described a variety
of reasons why they believe initiative refonn is important. The most common problems
brought up are that the signature-gathering and public vote constituted a poor way of
making good public policy, that voters may not understand ballot measures and end up
voting against their own interests, and that the process had lost its integrity and moved
away from its original intent. They went on to say how they believed a CIR might
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improve the initiative process. Not everyone shared the same level of optimism, but
everyone generally believed that the eIR would have a positive influence. This section
will describe their views and consider whether these constitute support for the ideational
explanation of supporting deliberative policy. The conclusion finds that the ideational
explanation was not an influential factor in earning votes and promoting legislative
success in comparison to the other explanations I will describe.
Many people spoke about the limitations of initiatives to craft quality public
policy. Senator Richard Devlin (D - Portland), the President of the Senate, recalled that
in the first eight years he served in the Senate, the legislature had devoted a significant
amount of its time to rewriting and dealing with initiatives that were poorly written and
did not work (Devlin 2010). Devlin recalls that Measure 47, a property tax measure that
was passed by initiative in 1996, had been "disparagingly talked about as if it had been
written in crayon because it was so poorly written that people couldn't understand from a
legal standpoint what it actually did." (Devlin 2010). The legislature was forced to create
Measure 50 to take the place of47 in order to avoid a decade oflegal battles over the
law's meaning (Devlin 2010). Rep. Devlin described how "in a very real sense the
initiative process is the antithesis of the legislative process" because it lacks debate,
analysis, and compromise, and instead operates as "winner take all" policy making
(Devlin 2010). Representative Chris Garrett (D-Lake Oswego) thought the initiative
process was a particularly inappropriate way of making fiscal decisions. As Garrett
explained, "the budget process is about setting priorities," and the initiative process does
not force voters to do this. Instead, "we just ask people year after year if they want a
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pony. And we don't ask them, do you want a pony if it cost this much, and we won't
have money to spend on healthcare?" (Garrett 2010).
Many people believed that the impacts of ballot measures have been unanticipated
by voters, and that marketing campaigns had largely determined their outcomes.
Representative Andy Olson (R-Albany) said, "those that do [read the voters' pamphlet]
are absolutely confused over what ballot measures are actually saying" (2010).
Representative Betty Komp (D-Woodburn) felt the same way about confusion over the
outcomes of ballot measures:
What I learned from the process, and what I thought as a citizen before I ever
thought about going into the legislature is, ballot measures are tricky. Sometimes
they are written to warrant a yes or a no answer, which might be the actual
opposite of what you think it is. So, they always have seemed to be confusing. I
remember the first time I ever looked at ballot measure 37 and I thought, do
people really understand what they are voting on here? The question crossed my
mind because you could interpret it multiple ways (2010).
One study has suggested that citizens will vote against their own interest and intentions
when ballot measures are confusing or poorly worded (Gastil et al. 2007, 1441). These
can be costly mistakes. Statewide ballot measures often decide important fiscal, social
and environmental policy issues that affect millions of citizens and determine the flow of
billions of dollars in public funds (Gastil et al. 2007, 1436). A statistic that many people I
spoke with were aware of was that nearly 50% of Oregon's discretionary budget
increases since 1990 were the direct result of ballot initiatives passed by voters (Morse
2010; Roblan 2010). The belief that voters should better understand the potential impact
of ballot measures was popularly shared my most of those interviewed. The ability of
deliberation to improve citizen's knowledge and understanding of the issues they discuss
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is a primary characteristic outlined in the deliberative literature (Gutmann and
Thompson 2004; Elster 1998).
Concern over the integrity of the initiative process was also a frequent area of
interest for those who had supported HB 2895. As Speaker of the House Representatives
Arnie Roblan (D-Coos Bay) put it, "nobody wants to see graft, nobody wants to see
manipulation, Republican or Democrat" (2010). The supporters of CIR used language
that indicated they thought that initiatives had been compromised, and should be returned
to their original intent. Representative Chris Harker (D-Beaverton) referred to the
initiative process as having been "hijacked" (2010). Representative Brad Witt (D-
Clatskanie) said that ballot measures often "hoodwink the voting public" and that "the
process is out of control" (2010). There were many references to the few individuals who
are believed to have had a disproportionate influence on Oregon's initiatives including
Bill Sizemore, Kevin Mannix, and Loren Parks (Brown 2010; Devlin 2010; Greenlick
2010). Representative Mitch Greenlick (D-Portland) worried that "the process has been
corrupted. It is not a citizen's process anymore but it is in the hands of people who can
put a million dollars into getting something on the ballot" (2010). The ability of
deliberation to challenge entrenched powers is outlined by Gutmann and Thompson
(2004) and Beierle and Cayford (2002) describe its usefulness in restoring the public's
trust in governing institutions.
There is a considerable amount of "angst" among lawmakers around the role of
money in the initiative process (Greenlick 2010). Bill Sizemore was mentioned as having
made his living off of the initiative process, and "with Mr. Sizemore leaving the scene,
people are vying to be Mr. Sizemore's replacement" (Devlin 2010). It is clear to many
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that "rich guys who don't live in Oregon" have been able to bankroll many initiative
campaigns, but there "are constitutional reasons why you can't change that very much"
(Greenlick 2010). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has "made it increasingly difficult for
states to craft regulations that stop wealthy individuals from purchasing a place on the
ballot" (Ellis 2002: 69). The Court's decisions in First Bank a/Boston v. Bellotti (1978)
and Citizens Against Rent Contra v. City a/Berkley (1981) disallowed states from placing
limits on initiative campaign contributions, and the Meyer v. Grant (1988) decision
prevents them from banning paid signature gatherers (Ellis 2002: 69). There is no doubt
that signature-gathering and initiative campaigns have become a business (Ellis 2020).
Another barrier to reform has been that "Oregonians love the initiative process"
(Roblan 2010) and "are not about to do away with it" (Devlin 2010). Although there is
evidence of an increasing dissatisfaction with the system's problems, for the most part
broad based public support has "insulated the initiative process from critical scrutiny"
(Ellis 2002: 121, 194) Rep. Garrett (2010) describes the dilemma this way:
There is political pressure to avoid a perception that the legislature, the class of
political elites, is trying to take power back from the people. Right? That is a
dangerous place to be. And it's a hard political conversation to have (2010).
Rep. Garrett was the only person I spoke to who openly derided initiatives as an
institution of government and believed that it should be abolished, saying it had "done
more harm than good for the state" and that "it is a fundamentally flawed way of making
fiscal policy" (2010). However, perhaps because of the wide perception that citizens like
the initiative process, Garrett described his legislative goals as wanting to "improve the
quality ofthe decision-making process" and not to eliminate ballot initiatives.
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The vast majority ofthose that r spoke to expressed support for the institution
of initiatives, and they described their reform efforts as attempts to return the initiative
process to its original intent. Rep. Greenlick expressed the sentiment succinctly:
Well, let me tell you my opinion, and I think it is probably shared by a lot of
other people, probably on both sides of the aisle. I really believe in the Oregon
system. I really believe in initiative, referendum and recall, which we created
here as a reaction to the fact that the banks and railroads ran the legislature. I
think the process is an important process. But I think the concept was intended to
be a citizen process.... So, many of us would like to [md reform in the initiative
process that brought it back to what is was supposed to be, which is a bunch of
citizens out gathering signatures (2010).
Ensuring that the initiative system works as it was originally intended, and in a way that
is driven by and empowers citizens, is a popular attitude among the lawmakers
interviewed.
The sponsors and supporters ofHB 2895 all believed that the CIR could
potentially have a positive influence on the initiative process. There were comments
made about improving the quality of democracy, providing more objective information to
voters, and potentially deterring out-of-state interests with less-than-pure intentions from
attempting to push policy through Oregon's initiative system. Each of these reflect the
theoretical outcomes of deliberation predicted by the deliberative literature.
Representative Ben Cannon (D-Portland) talked extensively about his belief in the
importance of deliberation, and thought the crR would be useful in promoting these
values:
The initiative system does not lend itself well to deliberative decision making.
Particularly given the complexity of the issues that voters face on the ballot, that
complexity requires real thoughtful and informed participation by voters. The
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Citizens' Initiative Review provided an experiment in helping voters make more
informed decisions (2010).
Everyone who I spoke to thought that a deliberative process would improve the initiative
process and address some of the problems they perceived, especially those having to do
with infonning voters. Some expressed a degree of skepticism about the influence the
CIR would actually have on voters' decisions. Rep. Greenlick called the CIR a "weak
solution" whose message was likely to be overwhelmed by advertising and expensive
campaigns (2010). "It's like shooting a squirt-gun at a fire," he quipped, before going on
to say that while its effects are marginal, they are not trivial because, "anything that
makes citizens feel more engaged is a good thing" (Greenlick 2010).
The general feeling of optimism, and the belief that deliberation can improve the
quality of the initiative system is reflective of the ideational explanation for endorsing
deliberative policy. All ofHB 2895's supporters believed that it would have a positive
impact, at least to some extent. However, ideational influences did not have a strong
bearing on the legislative outcome of HB 2895. Ideational support is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the endorsement of this deliberative policy. Legislatures would
not have voted for a policy that they did not think would work. However, belief in the
idea alone will result in very little being done to promote the bill in the legislative
process. We can look to the case of CIR in Washington as an example where the idea of
CIR had over twenty sponsors in the legislature who believed the process would be
effective, nearly as many sponsors as HB 2895 in Oregon had, but the bill was never able
to gain traction. The Washington bill had ideational sponsors, but not meaningful
advocates for the policy. There are much more powerful explanations for why HB 2895
successfully endured the legislative process. The ideational explanation describes a
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condition that should be present for a deliberative policy to gain endorsements, but it
does not describe the mechanism which allows the policy to be successful.
One area in which an ideational explanation might be salvaged is through
Tarrow's (1998) ideological frames. Reitman and Shuford were able to position the CIR
within the frame that initiatives are discussed, in order to make it broadly appealing and
difficult to oppose. The CIR was presented as an informational reform that aimed to give
citizens more information on what they were voting on. As I will discuss later, the bill's
advocates effectively positioned the CIR to be very difficult to ideologically oppose. This
will be described partially as a political legislative strategy to give election minded
politicians an incentive to support HB 2895. However, this positioning is equally an
ideational explanation for the lack of opposition that the CIR encountered. Based on the
CIR's exceptional positioning, politicians who made voting decisions based on ideas
would have found HB 2895 extremely difficult to find ideological space from which they
could oppose it.
IT'S ALL POLITICAL?
Political explanations assume elected officials will act based on incentives and
outside influences that pressure them into the decisions they make. This approach can
accurately describe the majority ofthe explanations that my research uncovered. For
example, the legislative strategy adopted by HB 2895's advocates is a powerful
explanation for success that presumes politicians will be election-focused and generally
make decisions that are least controversial. Other strong explanatory factors fall under the
political category as well, although they may be best described by theories from public
policy and social movement literature rather than the arguments from deliberative theory
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described in Chapter 2. For example, the bill's timing had an influence on its success,
and the confluence of social and political factors that timing entails are captures well by
Tarrow's (1998) description of political opportunity structures. The exceptionalism of the
CIR and its aims also made it stand out from the rush ofpolicy entrepreneurs who
introduced initiative reform legislation in the 2009 session, much like Kingdon (1984)
predicts will occur around open policy windows. The influence of the political climate at
the time of CIR's emergence is a powerful political factor which led to its widespread
endorsement. Kingdon (1984) has also described the importance of effective advocacy
for a policy's success, which also had a considerable influence on HB 2895. The timing,
advocacy, exceptionalism, and low-impact legislative strategy ofHB 2895 are described
well in the public policy literature and they each contain elements that are, in part,
political.
Each ofthese four explanations will be described and supported in tum below,
and their connection to the literature will be elaborated on in the concluding chapter.
Certain kinds of political explanations can tell us accurate things about why people were
supporting a deliberative policy in this case. Public policy and social movement literature
helps to paint a more complete picture of what needed to be going on in the broader
policymaking environment for this deliberative policy to succeed.
EXPLANATIONS FOR SUCCESS
In my conversations with Oregon political actors who supported HB 2895 in
2009, four explanations for their support and the bill's success emerged. To some extent
the idea of CIRs benefited from timing because there was considerable attention being
paid to initiative reform in the 2009 legislative session. Additionally, Reitman and
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Shuford's tireless advocacy and promotional efforts undoubtedly helped promote HB
2895's progress. The bill also benefited from the exceptionalism of its aims among the
multitude of initiative reforms being proposed at the time. Finally, the legislative strategy
that Reitman and Shuford adopted to introduce crR as a temporary pilot that would cost
no money, allowed the idea to gain traction, despite the fact that Oregon was facing an
enormous budget crisis in 2009. Each of these explanations seems to have had a critical
influence on the success of HB 2895, and if anyone of these factors had not been present
the CIR would not have found the support that it needed in 2009.
The following section will use the comments from public figures that supported
HB 2895 to describe the influence of each of these four explanations for the bill's
success. Interviews, woven together with history and other information and testimony
surrounding HB 2895 allows for the construction of a detailed account of why political
elites supported this deliberative policy. It is important to understand that these
explanations are not hermetically-sealed categories. Many actions from advocates, or
characteristics of the legislation, will fit under more than one category of explanation. In
this way, the explanations outlined are complementary to one another and weave together
closely to complete a story of what led HB 2895 to gain support in the Oregon legislator.
It should also be clear that no single explanation will do all the work of explaining
why HB 2895 found support. It was the combination of these four factors that caused
meaningful support to grow, and made legislative success possible.
Timing
When Reitman and Shuford brought crR into Oregon they happened to find
themselves in an auspicious time for initiative reform proposals. What timing really
57
entails is the coming together of favorable circumstances that helped to prime the
political climate for initiative reform proposals. There was a certain amount ofluck
involved in the situation that produced HB 2895, and 'timing' is the shorthand I will use
to describe the merging ofnumerous factors that brought initiative reform and HB 2895
onto the agenda. By many accounts, 2009 was an exceptionally active session for the
issue area of initiative reform, and this environment had clear benefits for the legislative
fortunes ofHB 2895. The ability ofReitman and Shuford to pair their policy proposal to
a problem area that was receiving heightened attention is reflective ofKingdon's (1984)
description ofmerging streams in policy making. There was also a favorable climate for
initiative reform outside of the legislature, in public organizations, that allowed for
Reitman and Shuford to find potential allies, and build social networks, just as Tarrow
(1998) describes. This section will present evidence about the advantageous environment
for initiative reform in the 2007 and 2009 legislative sessions.
Oregon's initiative process has long been an area of frustration for lawmakers.
According to Rep. Devlin, "you could go back a couple of decades and probably see
every proposal that has ever been thought of has been introduced at one time or another"
(2010). Ten years before the CIR came to Oregon, the state had experienced a wave of
reform proposals in the 1997 and 1999 legislative sessions, following an influential report
from the City Club ofPortland, but since then reform had been piecemeal and limited
(Ellis 2002: 73). In the past, initiative reform efforts had brought out strong opposition
from both the left and the right. Sen.Devlin recalled being "on legislative committees
where Lloyd Marbet was on the same podium with Bill Sizemore testifying in opposition
to changes. So, somebody from the left and somebody from the right" (2010). There was
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also a general perception that Oregonians liked the initiative process, which made
reforms a difficult sell and a low priority for the legislature.
However, by 2007 the public feeling around initiatives both inside and outside of
the legislature seemed to have changed. Kate Brown (D-Portland), then President of the
Senate, had made initiative reform a priority and promoted a package of reforms that
year. In the mean time, the City Club of Portland was undertaking another investigation
into the weaknesses of the initiative process, and their working group on the topic had
heightened public concern. With powerful actors like Brown advocating for reform and
influences from non-governmental groups building, the legislature created a strong
enough coalition to pass the "largest initiative reform package in a decade" (Devlin
2010). Kappy Eaton, the governance coordinator for the League of Women Voters of
Oregon helped to promote the reforms, and confirmed that, "it has taken quite a long time
to get the reforms that were passed in 2007" (201 0).
These legislative successes did not mark the end of attention for initiative reform.
In January of2008 the City Club ofPortland officially published the conclusions of its
working group on initiatives and suggested significant additional changes to the process
(City Club of Portland 2008). This report gained the attention of both citizens and
lawmakers. Some of the recommendations of that report would be proposed as legislation
in the 2009 session. At the same time, Reitman and Shuford were promoting their CIR
idea and gaining suggestions from politicians like Brown and political actors like Eaton.
Based on the suggestions they received, and seeing an opportunity in the 2008 election
cycle, Reitman and Shuford ran a trial of the CIR process in September 2008. Shortly
following this project in October of 2008, the Oregon Business Association (OBA)
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launched their own working group to discuss and promote initiative reforms. This
"Initiative Reform Coalition" included "business and labor leaders, state legislators and
the Governor's office in designing a package of statutory and constitutional changes to
reform the initiative system,,4 (Cosgrave Vergeer Kestler 2010). Reitman and Shuford
became regular attendees ofthe working group, along with Eaton and representatives of
other non-profit organizations including Common Cause. These opportunities to gain
allies and build collective identities suggest that a favorable political opportunity
structure existed around initiative reform (Tarrow 1998). In November of 2008, the
Oregon Public Broadcasting radio show "Think Out Loud" devoted an hour to discussing
how to reform the initiative process after the topic was suggested by a listener. The
program featured Arden Shenker discussing the recommendations from the City Club of
Portland's report, Shuford promoting the CIR, as well as Senator Frank Morse (R-
Albany) expressing his belief in the need for reform. Initiatives had continued to gather
attention from non-governmental organizations, state representatives, and the public.
In the 2009 session, conversations and proposals for initiative reform in Salem
swirled. Sen. Devlin described, "a tremendous amount of discussion" and Rep Harker
recalled, "this was something that got talked about a lot in the house caucus" (2010). Rep.
Rob1an suggested that, in addition to working groups and reports, the initiative season of
2008 had been a particularly active one, "and people were rather uptight about it" (2010).
A plethora oflegis1ative proposals emerged from aBA's work group and came through
the House Rules Committee, HB 2895 being among them. Just as Kingdon (1984)
4 In 1996, Portland City Club proposals had resulted in the fonnation of a very similar bipartisan working
group of the state's political leaders called the "Oregon Initiative Committee" (Ellis 2002: 194). Seemingly,
the emergence of initiative refonn on the legislative agenda followed a very similar path in 1997 as in
2007.
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describes, policy entrepreneurs like Reitman and Shuford had flocked to the issue area
where there was a window of opportunity. For initiative reform proposals that failed, CIR
became a back-up bill for politicians to support. Sen. Morse, Rep. Witt, and Rep. Harker
all mentioned working on their own failed initiative reforms before adopting support for
the CIR. As Rep. Harker said about his own failed proposal, "if we couldn't get that done
we wanted to get something done" (2010). HB 2895 became that something for Rep.
Harker and others.
While the bill's timing was mostly fortuitous for Reitman and Shuford, 2009 was
also a year when the state of Oregon experienced a huge financial crisis (Roblan 2010).
In this respect, the situation that Reitman and Shuford faced for their CIR proposal was
hugely restrictive, because new programs were at the bottom of the state's priorities, and
any request for state funding would have been a complete non-starter (Nathanson 2010;
Reitman 2010). Although they would have liked to ask for money from the state to help
Healthy Democracy Oregon run the CIR, the timing of their proposal made this
impossible. With some creative and adaptable legislative strategy, HB 2895 was able to
succeed in spite of the financial challenges at the time.
Overall, its timing was a benefit to HB 2895 and the bill would have been
unlikely to succeed without preexisting interest in the issue area. In Kingdon's (1984)
language, a problem stream was present for Reitman and Shuford to pair their policy
solution to, and in Tarrow's words, a political opportunity structure had emerged that
lowered the cost of collective action for Reitman, Shuford and their political allies.
Where as the crR had toiled in obscurity for six years in Washington, the idea had gained
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legislative success in Oregon within two regular legislative sessions. Rep. Roblan was
impressed with the relative speed of the reform:
Changing the order of things in a voter's pamphlet, that's a pretty hefty lift. It
had to have been. In general in this building bills take three to four sessions to
generate both the interest and get it fine tuned enough that they are willing to
move it to the next level. i.e. become a law. And that happens over and over and
over again (2010).
Without the working groups ofpolitical elites discussing initiative reform, Reitman and
Shuford would have found it extremely difficult to find interested legislatures, and build
coalitions of advice and support in order to move their bill forward. Where timing
favored them, they were able to take full advantage. Its timing had an invaluable
influence on the progress ofHB 2895, but it is only the first of four factors that, working
in conjunction, explain the political support for deliberative policy in Oregon.
Effective Advocacy
A second explanation for the success of HB 2895 stems from the devoted and
effective advocacy which the bill enjoyed. While nearly all legislative proposals will
have advocates, the CIR enjoyed persistent support from three very effective sources. The
first and most influential source of advocacy for the bill was the work of Reitman and
Shuford. By all accounts the two did an extremely good job of lobbying and promoting
the idea of CIR. As policy entrepreneurs, they "invested sufficient resources" to get their
proposal enacted (Kingdon 1984: 213). The bill also had support from politicians in
powerful positions which helped to ensure its success. Advocacy for the bill also came
directly from ordinary constituents who had participated in the trial CIR in 2008, in the
form oflobbying representatives and giving testimony at public hearings. Together these
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supporters helped the bill to negotiate the legislative process and gather enough
support to pass handily in the House and Senate.
Reitman and Shuford's advocacy for the CrR in Oregon really began in the 2007
legislative session when they first introduced crR legislation. At the time they had
support from Kappy Eaton from the League of Women Voters of Oregon, and a few other
advisors including Ned Crosby, the inventor ofthe CrR policy and the funder of Rietman
and Shuford's efforts. They had only one legislative sponsor for their bill. At the time
Reitman and Shuford sought and received support and advice from important players in
initiative reform, including then president ofthe Senate, and now Secretary of State Kate
Brown (Brown 2010)5. Although the bill failed to receive a single Rules Committee
hearing, the session had given Reitman and Shuford an opportunity to lay the
groundwork for their lobbying efforts in the future by making a few connections in the
House and Senate, and by obtaining experience with legislative council (which drafts the
language oflegislation). They also learned about the potential difficulties ofthe
committee hearing process.
Reitman and Shuford did a huge amount of work organizing and running the trial
crR in 2008 and used this as a chance to produce promotional materials and increase
public awareness for their idea. The Healthy Democracy Oregon website features
extensive pictures and videos from this first CIR (Healthy Democracy Oregon 2010).
They had the findings of their Citizen Panel presented on the steps of the Capital building
in Salem with media present. News articles about the process and its findings appeared in
5 Brown gave advice to assist in Reitman and Shurford's efforts, but was not an active advocate for HB
2895 because she was busy promoting her own regulatory reforms to the initiative process in the 2009
session, HB 2005 (Brown 2010).
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newspapers around Oregon and online (Hammond 2008; Steves 2008; Manning 2008).
Most people, even those in the legislature, remained unaware that the process had taken
place, but a few heard about the eIR this way including Rep. Garrett (2010), and Rep.
Roblan. Indeed, Roblan described hearing about eIR, but not devoting much thought to it
at the time:
The group that came to the legislature had actually done entirely on their own the
election before, they had set up a process and had an initiative review. And so, I
had heard about the process. I hadn't really watched it. I did see, I think, their
voter's statement that they had made for the voters pamphlet. It wasn't really
high on my radar but I knew that it had happened (2010).
Nonetheless, knowledge ofthe eIR was slowly growing and Reitman and Shuford gained
new evidence and materials from the eIR trial to assist with their advocacy efforts in the
future.
In the 2009 legislative session Reitman and Shuford set out on extensive lobbying
for the bill. The majority ofthe sponsors ofHB 2895 who I spoke to recalled first hearing
about eIR through a visit from Reitman and Shuford:
Well, I first heard about it from that organization [Healthy Democracy Oregon],
and it seemed like an excellent idea (Greenlick 2010).
A group of a few individuals who I believe probably came from this organization
came to see me and if I would be willing to support this being introduced in the
house. Itold them that I would (Devlin 2010).
I think that it was, Elliot and the folks at Healthy Democracy Oregon who first
mentioned the concept to me. I mean, it's very commonplace for us to get ideas
for legislation from organizations or individuals who contact legislators and say,
"hey is this something you'd be interested in working on?" I don't think I was
aware of that mechanism before I heard about it from them (Cannon 2010).
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Members recall Reitman and Shuford being very active in promoting the bill. The
bill's chief sponsors recall Reitman and Shuford as the bill's driving force:
Our office got pretty involved in the bill. Elliot and Tyrone spent a fair amount of
time here and I was very receptive to them as soon as they came in and we kind
of helped move the thing along by getting meeting space, coordinating things. I
did not personally go out and campaign hard on behalf of it, but I provided them
with some vehicles, if you will, for moving it forward ... Tyrone and Elliot
basically did the bulk of the legwork (Harker 2010).
Rep. Roblan was particularly impressed with the ability of Reitman and Shuford to gain
bipartisan support, and believed the bill owed its success to their impartiality:
The only reason this bill passed is because the two people, who you mentioned
before, had done such a good job that no one can figure out whether they are
Republican, Democrat, independent or whatever. .. Tyrone and Elliot are a big
part of the story on this particular one. In fact, maybe the whole story. I don't
know that it would have happened without them. And I don't think that it would
have survived the first attempt if everyone hadn't believed it was totally impartial
(Roblan 2010).
Secretary Brown agrees that Reitman and Shuford's advocacy was invaluable, and she
highlighted the importance of convincing people to feel strongly that the CIR has value:
I have to tell you, you know, I have to be honest, I think Elliot's passion and
Tyrone's enthusiasm and energy around this issue make a huge difference
because not having [eIR], you don't know what the downsides are and we don't
know what the upsides are (Brown 2010).
Reitman and Shuford were able to play the role of lobbyists and policy entrepreneurs
extremely well. They were completely devoted to their promotional efforts, thanks to
financial support from Crosby. They were able to gather many bipartisan sponsors from
both houses, and educate enough legislators about the meaning and benefits ofthe bill to
have it pass the House and Senate with large majorities.
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Not only were Reitman and Shuford able to get a great number of sponsors for
their legislation, but they also happened to enlist the help of the right people who were in
a position to assist with the progression of the bill. These sponsors were Democrats and
Republicans from both the House and Senate, and many became important advocates for
HB 2895 themselves. Having supporters inside of the legislature who were able to help
HB 2895 overcome the institutional obstacles of becoming a law made a valuable
contribution to its success. It was the opinion of many legislators I spoke to that having
support from key political players plays an important part in a bill's success (Brown
2010; Komp 2010; Harker 2010).
Two important sponsors ofHB 2895's were Rep. Roblan and Sen. Devlin, who
are the chair people of the House and Senate rules committees respectively. Having the
attention and support ofthe heads ofthe committees that HB 2895 would receive its
hearings in was helpful in getting and keeping the bill on the agenda. In the past CIR
legislation had failed twice to receive a single committee hearing. The feeling in
Washington in 2007 had been that a last minute change in the chairman of the committee
where the CIR bill awaited its hearing had spoiled the chances of the bill getting onto the
agenda (Reitman 2010) In 2009, Reitman and Shuford were sure to visit with Roblan and
Devlin or their staff often to answer questions and lobby for their continued support
(Reitman 2010; Roblan 2010). Once Roblan and Devlin were joint advocates of the bill
they were able to ensure that it stayed on the legislative agenda and successfully
maneuvered the hearing process.
The bill's chief sponsors were also active in advocating for the bill, and ensuring
its success in the legislature. One chief sponsor, Rep. Harker happened to sit next to Rep.
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Roblan on the House floor. He and his aid Megan Perry, were able to use this position
on the floor to check in with the chainnan of the House Rules Committee on the schedule
of hearings and the progress of amendments to HB 2895 (Harker 2010). The bill's other
chief sponsor, Rep. Cannon, had his staff working with Shuford and legislative council
on the drafting of the bill and its amendments (Cannon 2010). Chief sponsors would also
help to field questions from members of the legislature, especially about the funding of
the bill (Harker 2010). The advocacy from legislative sponsors should not be overlooked.
Through their coordinating and prodding, sponsors played an essential part in ensuring
HB 2895's gathered critical support.
The final source of advocacy for HB 2895 came from the public. After the CIR
trial in 2008, a few ofthe randomly selected citizens who had participated were
enthusiastic enough about their experience to call or visit their state representatives in
support ofHB 2895. Representative Suzanne VanOnnan (D-Hood River) recalled first
hearing about CIR from one of her constituents who had been a participant in the trial.
According to Rep. Roblan, "individual members mentioned to me that constituents who
had been selected for the panel were really high on it, and they had come and talked to
them. So, there was a word of mouth thing that happened from participants to members"
(2010). Not only did citizen participants in the CIR speak to their representatives, they
also attended committee hearings, published guest editorials in The Oregonian, and spoke
on the radio in support of CIR and HB 2895 (Fantz 2009; OPB 2008).
Rep. Cannon describes the influence of these constituent efforts as significant:
I think the legislature is quite sensitive to what we hear from our constituents. In
that sense the process works pretty well. We do on the whole reflect what we are
hearing from constituents. One of the problems is, only a few constituents are
67
really meaningfully engaged in the process, or actually letting their legislators know.
So, it doesn't take very many squeaky wheels to get the attention of legislators
(2010).
Rep. Roblan agreed, and emphasized that what he heard from citizens in committee was
particularly influential on his feelings towards CIR:
From my perspective, the hearings changed everything. I thought it was a nice
idea, I'd heard about it, I liked it, but it wasn't big. But when they brought in
people from Eastern Oregon who came here on their own dime to tell us how
important it was for them, and how transformational it was in their life to be a
jurist, I think most of the people in this building started hearing that and started
believing that, wow this has hit a chord with the average person. That they are
willing to spend their time effort and money, take a day off of work, whatever it
took, do be over here to talk about that experience. That, I think, changed a lot of
people. We like to hear real life stories of real people (2010).
Many of the bill's sponsors spoke about the importance of the relationship between the
legislature and citizens, and the importance of taking cues from constituents. Although it
came from only a small select group of people, who held no formal political power,
citizen advocacy ofHB 2895 contributed to the bill's legitimacy and helped to inspire
belief in the CIR process among state representatives.
The advocacy HB 2895 received from Reitman and Shuford, its legislative
sponsors in positions of influence, and from citizens were all effective at promoting CIR
and ensuring the bill's passage. Secretary Brown confirmed, "there's no question it's
important [for a bill] to have champions. Because of the amount of bills introduced every
session, three to four-thousand get passed, it's pretty easy to get lost in the shuffle"
(2010). Reitman and Shuford made effective policy entrepreneurs in many of the ways
that Kingdon describes. They were completely devoted to their goals, learned quickly
from experiences, and listened to good advice from advisors, sought press coverage, and
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met endlessly with potential allies in the legislature (Kingdon 1984: 214). The process
of developing and passing CrR legislation did "take years of effort" and Kingdon (1984)
predicts, but luckily for Rietman and Shuford, the role of favorable timing made it take
fewer years than policy proposals typically do (Roblan 2010). Additional advocacy came
from inside the legislature, where powerful sponsors were able to help HB 2895 through
institutional hurdles, and from citizens, who had participated in the trial of crR. This
strong network of allies who had emerged around the area of initiative reform contributed
to an opportunity structure where HB 2895 would succeed (Tarrow 1998: 20). Good
quality and sufficiently devoted advocacy is a strong explanation for HB 2895's success.
Exceptionalism
Another factor that contributed to the success of HB 2895 was the exceptionalism
of the CrR and its aims. As was previously highlighted, the 2009 session was subject to a
rash of initiative reform legislation, promoted by policy entrepreneurs who wanted to
take advantage of the favorable political climate in the issue area (Kingdon 1984).
Although this timing helped HB 2895 in many respects, it also placed the bill in
competition with numerous other bills aimed at the same subject. HB 2895 had qualities
that made it unique from the plethora of initiative reform proposals that year, and gained
it the sustained resources and attention to succeed. The informative aims of HB 2895 also
placed in a rare category of initiative reforms that is ideologically positioned in a way
that makes it difficult for politicians to vocally oppose. Based on its positioning the
collective frame of initiative reform, HB 2895 dodged opposition and gained ideational
support (Tarrow 1998).
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By all accounts, state legislators were "very proactive" on the topic of initiative
reform in the 2009 session (Brown 2010). Numerous bills on proposed initiative reforms
were introduced in the House and referred to the House Rules Committee for hearings.
As the CIR had experienced in they past, being referred to committee does not
necessarily mean a bill will ever receive a hearing. HB 2895 was one of ten other
initiative reform bills on the Committee's agenda when it received its first hearing on
March 30,2009 (The Oregonian 2009). Of those ten bills receiving public hearings, only
three (including HB 2895) would eventually be referred back to the House for a vote. The
majority remained in committee until the legislative session expired, over seven months
later in November. Facing these types of odds, HB 2895 needed to be unique enough to
command the attention it needed to move it through the legislative process. HB 2895 was
inherently unique because ofthe deliberative quality discussion it entailed, and because
of its aims of providing more and better information to the voting public. This
informational aim is one that is widely ideologically supported by lawmakers, and is
relatively uncommon among proposed initiative reforms.
The Secretary of State, Kate Brown, has been a longtime advocate of initiative
reform. She identifies initiative reforms as being in one ofthree categories: regulatory,
structural, or informative (Brown 2010). Regulatory reforms are by far the most common,
and they are aimed at making changes to the procedures of the initiative process in order
to eliminate fraud and efficiently allocate state resources. Typically, reforms ofthis
nature deal with procedures around signature-gathering, drafting ballot titles, and other
procedures that initiative campaigns face. Secretary Brown informed me that regulatory
reform is the area where the legislature has been able to make the most progress in the
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past few sessions (2010). Rep. Harker remembers the majority of the reforms that were
considered in the OBA's Initiative Reform Coalition work group were aimed at
regulating or changing the initiative process (Harker 2010). This type of reform is where
the greatest number of proposals are aimed, and the greatest number ofbills are passed,
making it the most competitive category for proposed reforms.
Structural reforms are those aimed at making constitutional changes to the
structure of the initiative process. The most talked about example of this type of reform
from 2009 was the "indirect initiative" proposal. The idea (HJR 17) proposed a
significant change to the initiative process by requiring initiative petitions to be submitted
to the legislative assembly for one session before they appeared on the ballot for voters.
This structure for the initiative process was recommended by the City Club of Portland's
initiative report, and sponsored by Sen. Morse, who later became a co-sponsor ofHB
2895. This particular reform never left the Rules Committee, and Secretary Brown
described structural constitutional changes as being the most difficult to pass. Reforms
that would restrict, slow, or otherwise alter the normal initiative process often face strong
political opposition. Most politicians will typically vote to protect the current process.
The final category of initiative reforms, where the CIR belongs, is informative.
Informative reforms are those that aim to provide more or better information to voters on
ballot measures. These reforms assume that voters could make better decisions for the
state if they understood more about the impacts of the measures they are voting on.
Informative reforms will not restrict, or add layers of procedures to the existing initiative
process, so they are well liked by politicians, and they do not inspire opposition from
initiative campaign organizers. Sen. Richard Devlin recalled that there was "no organized
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opposition" to HB 2895 as it made its way through the legislature. When asked why
not, he highlighted two things, "A) they probably don't perceive it as a threat, and B) it's
probably something that is hard to come out vocally in opposition to" (Devlin 2010).
Rep. Garrett went further, saying, "Why wouldn't you support it? There's no cost and it's
a measure that gets citizens involved and lets them weigh in. I mean, there's all kinds of
nice democratic values that this bill implicates" (2010). When Senator Vicki Walker (D-
Eugene) stood to defend HB 2895 on the Senate floor she said, "this is really just
infonnation, and I think the more infonnation the better" (Senate Floor Debate 2009).
The "nice democratic values" and nonthreatening nature of this infonnative bill helped to
make it much more politically viable than structural refonns. It also positioned the CIR in
an ideological space within the initiative refonn framework that made it easy for
politicians to support, and difficult to oppose (Tarrow 1998). This aspect of
exceptionalism suggests that there is an ideational explanation for why political elites
who were minimally reached by Reitman and Shuford's advocacy, or who were not
necessarily involved in the growing networks of people interested in initiative refonn at
the time, may have voted for HB 2895.
Infonnative refonns are the least commonly proposed initiative refonns. Among
the sponsors that I spoke to, HB 2895 was the only initiative refonn they could remember
that was directly and primarily targeted at providing more infonnation to voters in 2009.
There have been proposals in the past to include more infonnation in measures' ballot
titles, but purely infonnational refonns remain rare (Eaton 2010). This unique angle on
refonn gave HB 2895 an exceptional quality, and earned it more attention among
lawmakers than many of the other ideas put forward in 2009. The vast majority of the
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reform bills proposed were regulatory. Many of these did pass into law, but having
informative aims certainly helped to keep HB 2895 from being "lost in the shuffle"
(Brown 2010).
Because CIRs aim to inform voters ofthe conclusions from deliberative citizen
discussions in the voters' pamphlet, they are firmly in the informative category of
reforms. Its positioning this category made the CIR as nonthreatening to the initiative
process. Its exceptionalism allowed HB 2895 to gain votes and avoid organized
opposition in the legislature for ideational reasons. Some of the bill's other qualities, like
the fact that it had no cost to the state, do not make it exceptional among other initiative
reforms, but they were an important aspect ofthe bill's legislative strategy, which equally
contributed to its success.
Low-Impact Legislative Strategy
A fourth and final explanation for the success on HB 2895 was the low-impact
legislative strategy adopted by Reitman and Shuford in 2009. There were several aspects
ofHB 2895 that made it different from any previous CIR legislation proposed, and these
aspects allowed it to gain the support it needed to be passed. Some ofthese
characteristics also contribute to the bill's exceptionalism, but I have separated them out
to highlight their unique purpose and influence on HB 2895's success. For one thing, HB
2895 is a physically shorter piece oflegislation than those that were previously
introduced in Washington and Oregon, and it excludes complex tasks for the state to
undertake, such as the formation of boards to oversee CIRs. The bill also includes a
sunset clause to expire in January 2011, as well as a research component to study the
public impact of the CIR and its voters' pamphlet statement. Lastly, HB 2895 had no cost
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to the state. It would be completely privately funded by the nonprofit conducting the
CIRs, and there were limitations put on where they could draw funding from to ensure
the process was impartial. Reitman and Shuford utilized these strategies for the CIR
based on politicalleaming from past legislative failures, and good advice received from
their advisors, who included state representatives, former politicians, and experienced
lobbyists (Reitman 20 I0). The pair's strategy adapted to economic realities, predicted
political behavior, and was creative with what HB 2895 would and would not include.
Before introducing their CIR legislation in 2009, Reitman and Shuford received
extensive advice and guidance from Healthy Democracy Oregon's advisory committee6
and Board of Directors, which included Crosby and Berm among others. They also
received advice in meetings with the current Secretary of State Kate Brown and other
sitting State Representatives like Peter Buckley (Reitman 2010). Along with advice, they
leamed a great deal from the failures of CIR legislation in the past, both in Washington
and in Oregon. With these influences, there were major changes made to proposed CIR
legislation in 2009. One element of previous bills that was excluded in 2009 was the
formation of a commission in the State Department to oversee CIRs. Rather than include
the complex appointment process and outline the responsibilities of such a body, HB
2895 simplified the whole issue by asking the Secretary of State to appoint a nonprofit
organization to be responsible for the whole CIR process. This approach made the bill
significantly shorter, and made the procedural responsibilities of the State minimal. The
assumption being made was that the Secretary of State would choose Healthy Democracy
Oregon to conduct the CIRs, because they are the only group in the state with experience
6 Healthy Democracy Oregon's advisory board includes: Kappy Eaton, Jeff Golden, Mike Greenfield, Phil
Keisling, Andi Miller, Fread Neal, Norma Paulus, and Jack Roberts (Healthy Democracy Oregon 2010).
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conducting CIRs and probably one of the few who are aware the process exists.
Having Healthy Democracy Oregon take on responsibility for the running of the CIR
made the bill simpler and less intimidating. The choice also made sense in conjunction
with the other legislative choices that Reitman and Shuford made to make the bill
temporary and privately funded.
A second change that was made to CIR's previous legislative strategy was to
make the 2009 bill temporary, and to include a study of its impact. Reitman (2010)
explained that the idea came from good advice they received from Kate Brown, and a
perception that legislators would demand they test the idea before it would be
permanently implemented. Crosby had also floated the concept in the past ofmaking the
first occurrence of CIR a pilot "under the auspices of the state," complete with a voters'
pamphlet statement (Jim Rough Show 2002). HB 2895 was introduced to the House
without a date for repeal, but the date was added in its first round of amendments. The
bill was also amended to include a research component that mandated an evaluation of
the usefulness ofthe Citizen Reviews and their voters' pamphlet statements. HB 2895
established a CIR pilot program for the 2010 election cycle.
For some supporters, like Rep. Cannon, it was important that the CIR be
experimental:
I think it's a great opportunity to experiment in providing better information to
voters ... part of the value of the experiment, is to see whether there is any
discemable effect. I'm not interested as much in how it affected the outcome of
the measures as I am in what voters think:. Whether voters conclude that these
were useful tools or not (2010).
Rep. VanOrman agreed, saying:
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"You know, I have no idea how the people are going to receive this. That's why I
think it's good that they are going to do an evaluation. And that maybe we can
get some idea of the effect and the benefit of what they are trying to do" (20 I0).
Making HB 2895 temporary, with a study on its outcomes once again made this very
new idea less intimidating to lawmakers and even easier to support and vote for. There
was clearly a strategy of introducing the CIR to the legislature incrementally, while
giving them a chance to learn about the process and determine its value. The strategy was
an astute one according to Rep. Roblan, who after pointing out the often slow nature of
the legislative process mused, "I don't know that [HB 2895] could have been anything
other than incremental" (20 I0).
The most important strategic element of HB 2895 was that it did not cost the state
any money. The bill was originally introduced without a funding mechanism, but in the
hearing process it was amended to read that the organization conducting the CIRs will be
responsible for all of the associated costs, including the cost of printing the voters'
pamphlet statement. In order to avoid potential bias, the organization may not receive any
funding from political committees, corporations or unions. By all accounts, this move to
make the CIR free to the state was very important to its success. The budget crisis that
Oregon was experiencing in 2009 made funding new programs an extremely low priority
for the State (Reitman 2010; Nathanson 2010). According to Rep. Roblan (2010), the
State simply could not have funded the CIR in 2009. He credits Reitman and Shuford for
"continuing to step forward and say, we'd be willing to do what we need to do, and go
raise the money to do it" (Roblan 2010). Rep. Cannon remarked that Healthy Democracy
Oregon offering to fund the project was what "made it possible to pass a bill in the [2009]
session" (20 I0). Rep. VanOrman reflected the feelings of most when she said, "one of
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the appeals of it was of course they didn't ask for any money. Because we didn't have
any. If it had money attached it probably wouldn't have gotten very far" (2010).
Following the passage of HB 2895, Reitman and Shuford have elicited donations,
undertaken fundraising, and sought out grants to help fund the future CrRs. The majority
of the funding they have raised comes from Healthy Democracy Oregon's board of
directors, including Crosby (Healthy Democracy Oregon 2010)7. They have also received
a number of pledges from family foundations and individuals (Healthy Democracy
Oregon 2010).
Secretary Brown recalls the advice she gave to Reitman and Shuford on the
funding issue this way:
My usual conversation on budget stuff is you either need to have a legislator who
is very committed to making this a priority and will help you fmd the funding
and is in a powerful place to do so... Those folks are pretty few and far between,
and those folks can only do that maybe once or twice a session. And so the better
route was probably being able to accept nonprofit, private dollars to fund
whatever project they wanted to do (20 I0).
Reitman and Shuford followed this advice and adapted their legislative strategy to take
account for the economic climate at the time. Since state funding was unlikely, they were
willing to take on the challenge of bankrolling the project for the temporary life of the
bill. What the pair is counting on is that Oregonians will like the CrR, and use the voters'
pamphlet statement. Following the pilot, Healthy Democracy Oregon will have research
to reflect the crR's utility to voters, and be in a strong position to re-approach the
legislature in 2011 to ask that the process become a permanent function ofthe state. By
7 Healthy Democracy Oregon's Board of directors is: Ned Crosby, founder of the Jefferson Center, and his
wife Patricia Benn. Tyrone Reitman, co-founder ofHealthy Democracy Oregon. Scott Borduin, the vice-
president of Autodesk Inc. Mick Mortlock, a consultant and futurist. And Susan Edwards (Healthy
Democracy Oregon 2010).
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this point they hope to have proven to lawmakers that the cost of funding CrR is
justified by its benefits.
Because of the legislative strategy that HB 2895 adopted, opposition to the bill
was very difficult to justify. As mentioned earlier, the CrR is already difficult to vocally
oppose because it is not restrictive ofthe initiative process and it attempts to enact some
"nice democratic values" (Garrett 2010). When Reitman and Shuford made it temporary
and free to the state as well, they had nearly eliminated any reason to vote against it.
While the numbers voting in favor ofHB 2895 were fairly overwhelming in both the
House and Senate, there were seven Republicans who chose to vote against it in each
chamber. A common opposition heard from those who stood to speak in opposition to
HB 2895 was that the state had no way of ensuring the CrR would be an objective
process, and it would be "wrongheaded to let nonprofits make state endorsed statements
in the voters' pamphlet" (Senate Floor Debate 2009). However, Reitman, Shuford and the
others working on drafting ofHB 2895 had already thought of this criticism as well, and
as Sen. Morse explained when he stood to defend HB 2895 in the Senate, each CrR
statement in the voters' pamphlet will include an explanation stating, "these are NOT
official opinions or positions endorsed by the state of Oregon or any government agency"
(Senate Floor Debate 2009). The legislative strategy that went into this short bill was
extremely thorough and effective at both quelling fears and eliminating opposition.
For those who still voted against HB 2895, the explanation might lie in the view
described in Chapter 2 that deliberation should not be a function of the state. Senator Ted
Ferrioli (R - John Day) the Senate Republican Leader, spoke in opposition to HB 2895
saying:
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People already have the tools and rights necessary for them to convene any kind of
organizational group that they want to convene, to debate the issue in any way
that they wish to debate, to conclude as they might one way or another, or to add
or detract any information that they wish to, and to publish their
recommendations and findings in the voters' pamphlet (Senate Floor Debate
2009).
Sen. Ferrioli goes on to call HB 2895 completely unnecessary. Sen. Ferrioli would likely
agree with Habermas's conception that deliberation should take place outside of
government institutions, so as to keep it less costly, and ensure it is unrestricted. A
government run deliberative policy is unlikely to ever gain the endorsement from those
who adopt this view.
Ultimately, Reitman and Shuford would like to have made the erR a permanent
and state-funded process. However, they realized that they would be unlikely to have
success with that proposal when the erR was still a little known process, and the state
had no money to devote to new programs. They also learned from past failures that a
long, complex and demanding bill was unlikely to attract the support it would need to
succeed. Being effective policy entrepreneurs, Reitman and Shuford were adaptable and
creative with their legislative strategy, and were able to craft a much more appealing bill
for legislatures that would be extremely difficult to oppose and would help to strengthen
their case for adoption the erR in the future (Kingdon 1984). The fact that HB 2895
excluded the formation ofboards and oversight committees, and instead positioned itself
as an experiment in deliberation that had no cost to the state, is a powerful explanation
for its legislative support and success. Reitman and Shuford went out of their way to
develop legislation that would be easy to support for election-minded politicians who
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might oppose new spending or wholesale changes to a well liked state institution,
making low-impact legislative strategy a form of political explanation for HB 2895's
support.
CONCLUSION
For the case ofHB 2895 and CIRs in Oregon, research has given us four
explanations for why this policy was able to succeed. It was a result oftiming, effective
advocacy, exceptionalism, and low-impact legislative strategy. There is a long history of
deliberative projects and failed CIR promotions in Washington that led up to the CIR's
introduction to Oregon. With clever and devoted advocates, and auspicious timing that
gained it attention and exposure, HB 2895 was able to make its way into Oregon's law
books. This particular bill has been a success, but the story for CIRs in Oregon is far from
over. CIR's future depends in part on the pilot program and the results from its
evaluation. Time will also tell if the conditions for success I have described remain in
Oregon for the 2011 legislative session, when Healthy Democracy Oregon will likely
reintroduce legislation to institutionalize the CIR. Along with the underlying condition of
ideological support and political strength, any CIR bill in the future willlike1y need
continued favorable timing, advocacy, exceptionalism and legislative strategy to succeed.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
This research revealed what led political elites to support the deliberative policy
HB 2895 in Oregon was a combination oftiming, effective advocacy, policy
exceptionalism and low-impact legislative strategy. Each ofthese factors contains a
version of a political explanation within them, and exceptionalism includes an ideational
aspect as well. The previous chapter has described and presented evidence for each of
these explanations. This final chapter will explicitly tie the explanations that exist in the
literature to what was empirically observed. Examining the strengths and weaknesses of
each ofthe various arguments made in the literature will outline where existing
characterizations of deliberative policy making have worked, and where they failed to
explain elements of this case. The chapter will end with a thorough examination of what
conclusions can be brought away from the research I have done, as well as what
questions this research cannot answer and will require further examination in the future.
IDEATIONAL
Ideational arguments for the adoption of deliberative policies purport that policy
makers choose to support deliberative policies based on ideas. Supporters believe a
policy's outcomes will have a positive impact on some process. The ideational view sees
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policy happening as a result of a choice by decision makers to adopt deliberation
because of its educational and legitimizing powers, and not as the result of any mounting
political pressures to act. What this research looked for as evidence to support the
ideational explanation were political elites who described the benefits of deliberation as
being their express goal in supporting HB 2895, as well as the absence of political and
other forces that could explain their choices more accurately.
To a large extent, the conditions of belief in the benefits of the eIR process for
ideational support were expressed by supporters in interviews. Legislators hoped that the
eIR would increase the public's trust in the institution ofballot initiatives, just as Beierle
and eayford (2002) claim deliberation will accomplish. They also talked about the
process's ability to upset entrenched powers in the public discourse, and increase public
knowledge on the issues citizens vote on, each of which Gutmann and Thompson (2004)
and Welsh (2000) have identified as outcomes of deliberation. It was cornmon to hear the
bill's supporters express their belief that the eIR process can give more and better
information to voters, and improve the quality of decision making (Garrett 2010; Roblan
2010).
There were some skeptics of the influence of the eIR process who were
supporters anyway (Greenlick 2010; Garrett 2010). This would indicate to me that the
legislative strategy that made HB 2895 temporary and experimental had a greater
influence on those actors' support than their actual belief in the policy did. Alternatively,
it could be that the exceptional ideological position of eIR as an informative bill caused
them to support HB 2895 for ideational reasons, even though they were not enthusiastic
believers in the bills efficacy. For the most part however, supporters ofHB 2895
---_._------
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expressed a genuine belief in the benefits that deliberation could contribute to the
initiative process.
In this way ideational support was clearly present among supporters of HB 2895,
but it remains a weak explanation. When looking at the failed case of CIR in Washington,
there are numerous legislative sponsors there who believed in the benefits of deliberation
as well, but the CIR bill was not successful there. A comment from Rep. Greenlick was
particularly revealing as to why this might be the case. Asked ifhe would support a CIR
bill that had a large fiscal impact, he said, "I probably would sign on to it too, but I know
it would get killed in ways and means" (Greenlick 2010). Legislators who believe in the
benefits ofthe process may become 'supporters' of an idea with the knowledge that it
will actually fail due to its legislative strategy. These people are ideational supporters of
the idea, but are not real supporters of the bill in question, and make poor advocates for
its progress and success. In this way, ideational support for a policy is a poor indicator of
whether or not an idea's legislative support will have a meaningful effect.
The ideational explanation can be downplayed as a powerful tool for predicting
success for deliberative policy. Even though it is a condition that is present in this case
study, it has also been present elsewhere without much effect. It is true that policy makers
will need to believe that a deliberative policy is going to work in the most basic sense in
order to vote for it. It may also help if a deliberative policy is able to position itself in the
framing of an issue area in a way that politicians will find ideologically difficult to
oppose. However, among the factors that will lead policy makers to support and promote
some deliberative policy, it is a minimally influential one.
83
POLITICAL
In a political explanation, policy actors will choose to support deliberative policy
out ofpolitical necessity. In this view the decision to support deliberation will not be
made out of any altruistic belief in its benefits, but rather out of some need to escape or
negotiate a difficult political situation. The conditions that would indicate the political
explanation is at work would be if there seems to be an inability to make difficult
political decisions, ifpoliticians are election-focused, or if they are acting strategically in
a way they feel will benefit them. Dryzek (1990) tells us that ifthere are many groups
with similar power competing for influence it will more likely lead to the adoption of
deliberation. Fung and Wright (2003) say ifthere are few alternative solutions, this also
makes deliberation more likely.
Many of the specific conditions ofthat authors have described are completely
absent from this case study. Often because ofthe nature of the issue area that CIRs are
aimed at. Weaver's (1986) conceptions of "passing the buck" did not apply to policy
makers in this case because deliberation was not occupying an area where politicians are
normally forced to make decisions. The CIR is designed to assist in the decisions of
voters on ballot initiatives. Therefore using citizen deliberation in this case did not
actually change the site of a policy decision from inside to outside of the legislature.
Also, Schattschneider's (1960) description of "socializing conflicts" when politicians
believed they stood to gain from involving an audience in decision making, was not
present. There were never any claims made by supporters that they thought deliberation
would favor either a left or right wing agenda. In fact, some supporters believed that the
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erR succeeded because of its neutrality, and that it would have failed otherwise
(Roblan 2010). Such is the nature ofmaking changes to the initiative process in Oregon.
Dryzek's (1990) suggestion that there being many groups with similar power
competing for influence will lead to deliberation, also does not apply well to this case
because ofthe initiative issue area. Since ballot initiatives could be dealing with several
different topics in the same year, each one has its own opponents and proponents and
their relative power over the election may be equal or unequal. Finally, Fung and
Wright's (2003) claim that a lack of alternative solutions will make deliberation a more
likely choice is not supported by this case. There were an abundance of alternative
solutions being proposed to reform the initiative process at the time HB 2895 found
support.
One aspect of the political explanation that was observed in some ways was the
assertion that politicians will behave in an election focused way and may be unable to
make necessary decisions if they are politically difficult. This type of behavior is the way
many people characterized the inability of the Oregon legislature to pass significant
initiative reform in the past. As Borwn (2010) pointed out, and many others were aware,
the legislature had been unsuccessful at passing structural changes to the initiative system
because ofthe opposition it brought out from both sides ofthe political spectrum, and the
perception that initiatives are liked by the public. This reluctance persists, in spite of the
fact that initiatives have had an enormous impact on Oregon's budget and in the view of
many are an inappropriate way of setting fiscal policy (Garrett 2010; Morse 2010). This
inaction on dramatic initiative reform squares with the election-minded behaviors that
prevent meaningful action, which Weeks (2000) describes as political dysfunction (363).
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This type of political behavior leading politicians to endorse deliberation, as a round-
about way of dealing with an issue, fits well with observations ofHB 2895 in Oregon.
There were also many concessions made my Healthy Democracy Oregon in the
legislative strategy of HB 2895 that played to the political reasoning of state
representatives as well. The fact that the CIR had to be temporary, experimental, and free
in order to gain support shows that politicians were acting tentatively and avoiding costly
or dramatic changes. This shows that the bill's architects had expected legislators to
behave politically, and their strategy worked. Along with its positioning in the ideational
framework of acceptable initiative reforms, HB 2895's legislative strategy made it
difficult to oppose, and allowed the bill to pass with large majorities.
Weaver's (1986) theory of blame avoidance may also be at work here, although
there are indications both for and against it. Weaver predicts that politicians will seek to
avoid blame for unpopular or controversial actions above all else. Endorsing deliberation,
especially in the nonthreatening and temporary form that HB 2895 took, could be
interpreted as an attempt to meet a public demand for action while choosing a policy that
will not insight blame. To some extent this seems to be supported by evidence. Many
people reiterated that while initiative reform is usually problematic and contentious
(Devlin 2010), HB 2895 was not a controversial bill, and they "found it easy to support"
(Garrett 2010). The bill was certainly crafted in a way that would appeal to blame
avoiders. However, a few ofthe political actors I spoke to had actually endorsed more
dramatic and controversial regulatory and structural reforms in the 2009 session (Harker
2010; Morse 2010; Witt 2010), and it was only after these failed to succeed that they
turned to sponsoring HB 2895. These particular politicians at least, demonstrated a
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willingness to pursue contentious refonn ideas, and did not focus primarily on
avoiding blame as Weaver describes.
As I have outlined, many ofthe theories subsumed in the political category simply
did not apply to the case of CIR because of the nature of the initiative refonn issue area.
When Weeks (2000) gives an example of the political explanation for choosing
deliberation, he uses a case of budgetary issues for city councils. It may well be that
whether or not the political explanation has a great effect on supporting deliberation is
dependent on the issue area where deliberation is being implemented. The observations
from this research cannot conclude whether the political reasoning described in the
literature might have a greater influence on decisions to support policy outside of the
issue area of initiative refonn. Many other explanations that come from the public policy
and social movements literature present better conceptions of why policies build support,
and these also can be called variants of the political category of explanation.
EXPLANATIONS FROM PUBLIC POLICY LITERATURE
There are a few theories from public policy literature that describe the
observations from my case study very well. The explanations for supporting HB 2895
that I identified in Chapter 3 seem to match with predictions from Kingdon (1984) of
how agendas and policies are created, and Tarrow (1998) concerning how social
environments influence an idea's success, as well as reflect other authors in different
ways. This research supports the theories ofpolitical entrepreneurs, merging policy
streams, and political opportunity structures. These theories were able to provide a
framework that accurately outlined the kinds of factors that lead to adopting deliberative
policy in the case of HB 2895. Skocpol' s (1992) ideas about the influence of governing
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structures, and Melnick's (1994) ideas about venues can also be usefully applied to my
observations in describing how deliberative policies emerge and gain support.
Kingdon (1984) has provided an extremely useful model for characterizing how
HB 2895 found success within the legislature, and Tarrow (1998) gives a useful model of
how what was happening in broader society influenced the bill's support. These are
closely tied to the timing and advocacy explanations for HB 2895. Kingdon (1984) writes
about the merging of problem and policy streams, where problems are matched with
solutions by policy entrepreneurs. Promoters of a potential policy must then find an open
policy window, where the political climate presents an opportunity for their proposal to
find support and success. In many ways we see this pattern played out by Crosby,
Reitman and Shuford in the case of CrR. We can describe Crosby as having paired the
solution of Citizen Juries to the problem ofballot initiatives. We see Crosby being
unsuccessful with his policy proposal in Washington, but when Reitman and Shuford
adopt the idea in Oregon where there is a policy window open in the area of initiative
reform for 2007 and 2009, a crR pilot succeeds. This reflects Kingdon's (1984) idea of
merging of streams well.
Kingdon (1984) also writes about the need for policy entrepreneurs to "invest
sufficient resources" in order to get their proposals enacted (213). This emphasis on the
importance of policy advocates being devoted to their proposal was talked about
extensively by the HB 2895 supporters who r spoke to. Many people were frank about the
importance of the work Reitman and Shuford put into advancing HB 2895, as well as the
influence of other advocates from outside and inside of the legislature. Kingdon (1984)
also predicts that policy entrepreneurs will flock to open policy windows with their many
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proposals. This aspect is relevant to the area of initiative reform in the 2009 session,
when many reform proposals were introduced to the legislature. As Kingdon (1984)
predicts, "the system comes to be loaded down with problems and proposals" (213).
Many reform proposals were stopped in the committee hearing process, however HB
2895 was able to overcome this policy environment due to its exceptional approach to
reform, and by having advocates in powerful positions to help it along its way.
Tarrow's (1998) political opportunity structures can also be applied to the case of
CIR in Oregon. When Reitman and Shuford brought CIR to Oregon they clearly
benefited from a social and political environment where "networks and collective
identities" around the issue of initiative reform had begun to emerge (Tarrow 1998: 20).
Working groups and City Club reports on the topic of initiative reform coincided with
greater legislative attention to the area. It was advantageous for Reitman and Shuford to
promote the CIR in this type of atmosphere, where support for initiative reform was
widespread, and a "shared meaning that inspired people to collective action" had
emerged (Tarrow 1998: 21). The relative cost of sponsoring or endorsing a policy in this
issue area was reduced for policy makers.
Additionally, the way in which Crosby took deliberative policies from state to
state, searching for the right place in which to implement CIR is reflective of Skocpol
(1992) and Melnick's (1994) theories on the importance of structure and venues. Crosby
could seemingly not fit a deliberative policy to Minnesota's governing structure, but he
did find better conditions in Washington where the initiative process presented a potential
opportunity, and equally in Oregon. A period that could be described as venue shopping
had clearly taken place before the CIR landed in Oregon.
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This research supports the broad claims of Kingdon's and Tarrow's theories,
along with a few other authors, on the conditions policy needs to encounter in order to
gain critical support. By describing the explanations for HB 2895's support, my research
was able to layer a detailed picture of how this deliberative policy came to pass over the
theoretical framework that public policy literature provides. Describing this case
provided an empirical account of how these policy theories can be applied to the realities
of deliberative policy making.
THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
As the erR completes its pilot in August of2010 and looks to the future, the
results of this research will remain hugely relevant. Will the timing in Oregon's political
climate continue to favor erR and Healthy Democracy Oregon? Some signs point to no.
The Oregonian has reported that 2010 looks to be a particularly dead year for ballot
measures, with potentially as few as three measures appearing on the November ballot for
voters (Mapes 2010). It may be that having fewer initiatives will gain more attention for
the erR statements appearing in the voters' pamphlet, but it is unlikely that the area of
initiative reform will continue to inspire heightened attention from lawmakers without a
round of contentious ballot measures (Roblan 2010; Witt 2010). The state's economic
climate also remains in dire condition, which once again makes asking for state funding
to run the erR extremely difficult. Rep. Witt (2010) believed in the value of the erR
process, but was pessimistic about its future prospects, saying, "as much as we would
short ourselves, in terms of the democratic process, by not funding this, r simply don't
know where we'll get the money." It seems the policy window may be closing for eIR
before it gets the chance to establish a more permanent role in the initiative process.
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Many ofCIR's supporters remain cautiously optimistic. While being well
aware of the challenges CIR would face in becoming a permanent function of the state,
they encouraged Reitman and Shuford to continue to be creative and adaptive (Brown
2010; Olson 2010). Rep. Roblan (2010) imagined that the CIR could be something ofa
joint government and privately funded venture, or become the function of a "pseudo-
government" organization, as long as creators were careful to ensure the integrity of the
process. Sen. Devlin (2010) thought that if the state's budget had improved by 2011, they
just might be able to find $200,000 per biennium to support the process. Unfortunately
for its supporters, preliminary estimates from Crosby and Healthy Democracy Oregon see
the process costing more like $1.5 million, far more than any state legislators who I spoke
to estimated (Reitman 2010; Steves 2008).
The research question of why political elites supported HB 2895 in Oregon was
investigated through a detailed account of the policy making process that highlighted
timing, effective advocacy, exceptionalism, and low-impact legislative strategy.
Unfortunately, this project may not be able to explain support for deliberative policies in
issue areas outside of initiative reform as accurately, since other political factors that
were not present in this case might come into play. However this research does give a
very strong idea of what led to the widespread legislative support to pass a CIR pilot in
Oregon. So, for the purposes of passing CIR legislation, these results can be applied over
and over again, both in Oregon and in other states that have similar institutional
conditions where CIRs might be proposed.
In order to develop a more complete picture of what leads to the support of
deliberative policies, future research should focus on other deliberative mechanisms
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beyond the CIR, and other issue areas outside of initiative and electoral reform. It may
also be valuable to research support for deliberation in other states, regions, or countries
in order to observe impacts which institutional, electoral or structural factors might have,
as well as what influence culture might have on explaining support for deliberation.
This research can only truly be said to answer the question of why deliberation is
supported for the conditions in the case study I have examined. However, I feel it has
undoubtedly made a unique empirical contribution to answering the larger question of
how deliberative policy happens. This research has helped to begin to color in the lines
that the literature laid out, to complete a picture of what policy making looks like in the
area of deliberation.
The realities of Oregon's policy making process revealed by this research might
make the reader both cringe and applaud for various reasons. It is important to remember
that the bill I have examined here was a small and minimally publicized piece of
legislation, as the vast majority of the thousands of bills that will be passed in a
legislative session are. Most of the public in Oregon has never heard of the Citizens'
Initiative Review process, and it remains to be seen whether people will notice or use the
voters' pamphlet statements the Reviews produce in the 20 I0 election. What became
absolutely essential for the success ofthis one small bill among thousands was that it did
not cost any money or attract opposition. In the rigors of the committee hearing process,
if a bill that few people are paying attention to attracts the slightest opposition, it can
easily be tabled and never get onto the hearing agenda again. There are such a vast
number of proposals making their way through the legislative process that hang-ups over
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money or ideology can cost advocates a session, and force them to forfeit one year's
worth of work.
The role of advocates is also invaluable, and the more levels and locations they
come from the better. Enthusiastic citizens help, and legislators in key positions help, but
lobbyists are the most influential advocates for legislation since all subsequent support is
usually a result oftheir efforts. What was critical for Reitman and Shuford was that
Crosby was able to provide them with the money to pursue the crR legislation full time.
This is a positive sign for the pet projects of the independently wealthy, but not an
encouraging sign for policy entrepreneurs who are not in a financial position to maintain
lobbyists.
Oregon's political process is also subject to the whims ofthe broader social
world, and often agendas are set by the confluence of favorable conditions, or
opportunity structures, that no individual can control. In the past, the area of initiatives
has received heightened attention and seen significant reforms in one to two session
periods of activity (in 1997 and 1999, and in 2007 and 2009). Seemingly, the best way to
have legislative success with an idea is to have a movement behind you; to be in a
favorable political climate that allows you to ride with a wave of support on some topic.
From a normative standpoint, the crR brings quality and ideal deliberation to
twenty-four people at a time. It is a very valuable experience for those people who
participate, and will hopefully inspire further civic involvement for the rest oftheir lives.
However, it is unlikely that the state of Oregon will ever find it valuable enough to fully
fund the process. The state legislature did endorse the CrR's pilot, which shows that they
support deliberation in principle. Cities around the state are also using deliberation,
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including the City of Eugene, Oregon, where they are currently in the midst of a three
part citizen engagement project entitled "Envision Eugene" on planning the city's growth
and development (Envision Eugene 2010). Regardless of the eventual fate of the
Citizens' Initiative Review process in Oregon, its trial in 2008 and upcoming pilot in
2010 will serve as fantastic examples of deliberation in practice, and the ability of
ordinary citizens to engage in constructive policy discussions. They should also set a
precedent for quality future citizen engagement in Oregon.
APPENDIX A
WASHINGTON'S HOUSE BILL 1696
HOUSE BILL 1696
State of Washington 60th Legislature 2007 Regular Session
By Representatives McDermott, Haler, Haigh, Hunt, Jarrett, Linville,
Chase, Appleton, Moeller, Fromhold, Hasegawa, Miloscia, Dunshee,
Green, Ormsby, Strow, Sells and Kenney
Read first time 01/25/2007.
Referred to Committee on State Government & Tribal Affairs.
1 AN ACT Relating to facilitating the statewide initiative and
2 referendum processes under Article II, section 1 of the state
3 Constitution; amending RCW 29A.32.070, 29A.72.250, and 29A.72.260;
4 adding a new chapter to Title 29A RCW; and creating a new section.
5 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:
6 NEW SECTION. Sec. 1. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The legislature affirms
7 the state's long-standing policy of promoting informed public
8 discussion and understanding of statewide ballot measures and declares
9 that it is in the best interests of the state to provide for an
10 independent and impartial analysis ofthose measures to be made
11 available to voters so that they may thoughtfully evaluate the
12 measures. In support of these declarations, the legislature makes the
13 following findings:
14 (l) In Article II, section 1 of the state Constitution, the people
15 of the state of Washington reserved the right to initiate and vote on
16 legislation through the initiative and referendum processes;
17 (2) It is the long-standing policy ofthe state and an underlying
18 premise of democratic government that informed public discussion will
19 enhance the direct legislation process. This is supported by recent
p. 1 HB 1696
1 studies and surveys, presented to the legislature, suggesting that
2 review by an impartial and independent panel of Washington voters would
3 lead to better, more informed public discussion and would thus enhance
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4 the direct legislation process;
5 (3) The most effective way to make available this type of
6 independent and impartial information is for the state to convene
7 panels of voters, demographically representative ofthe state as a
8 whole, who will study and evaluate ballot measures through a quasi-
9 legislative hearing process, and to make the panels' findings public by
10 inclusion in the voters' pamphlet.
11 NEW SECTION. Sec. 2. CITIZENS INITIATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION
12 CREATED; GOVERNING BOARD. The citizens initiative review commission is
13 created as an independent commission within the legislative branch of
14 government. The commission's purpose is to ensure that citizens panels
15 are convened as specified in this chapter; that the activities of these
16 panels are conducted in a fair and impartial manner; that the funds of
17 the commission are spent efficiently and effectively; and that
18 appropriate training is provided to the panels, the panel moderators,
19 and commission staff. The board of commissioners shall consist of
20 twelve commissioners appointed to serve as follows:
21 (l)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, each
22 commissioner's term shall be three years. The governor, the attorney
23 general, and the secretary of state shall each appoint one
24 commissioner. Six commissioners shall be chosen by the evaluation
25 panels from among the former citizen panelists, in accordance with
26 section 7(2)(d) ofthis act. Three commissioners shall be chosen by
27 the panel ofmoderators from among former moderators in accordance with
28 section 7(3)(d) of this act. The terms ofthe commissioners shall be
29 staggered so that four commissioner terms expire each year.
30 (b) The commissioners appointed to the initial board shall be
31 appointed and serve in accordance with section 12 of this act.
32 (2) Commissioners must be registered voters ofthe state of
33 Washington and may not serve in any publicly elected office while
34 serving on the commission.
35 (3) Commissioners shall take office on January 1st of each year,
36 except in the case of the initial board appointed in accordance with
37 subsection (l )(b) of this section. Each commissioner shall serve until
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1 a successor is appointed and takes office. Vacancies shall be filled
2 by appointment in the same manner as for the commissioner so vacating.
3 If a vacancy results other than from expiration of a term, the vacancy
4 shall be filled for the unexpired term. Commissioners may not be
5 appointed to successive terms, except that if a commissioner is
6 appointed to fill an unexpired term of two years or less, or if an
7 initial commissioner is appointed to a one or two-year term, he or she
8 may also fill the next successive term.
9 (4) No commissioner may permit his or her name to be used or make
10 any campaign contribution in support of or opposition to any statewide
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11 ballot measure.
12 (5) The commission shall meet at least three times per year and may
13 appoint its own chair, vice-chair, and other officers and committees as
14 it deems appropriate and make rules for orderly procedure.
15 (6) Commissioners shall be compensated for their attendance at
16 commission meetings and reimbursed for their travel expenses related to
17 attendance at those meetings, in the same manner as citizen panelists
18 under section 4(3) of this act.
19 (7) The commission shall make all rules facilitating the conduct of
20 the commission and its activities under this chapter.
21 NEW SECTION. Sec. 3. CITIZENS INITIATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION
22 POWERS. The citizens initiative review commission has the following
23 powers:
24 (l) To select and employ an executive director and such research,
25 technical, and clerical personnel and consultants as the commission
26 deems necessary, whose salaries shall be fixed by the commission, and
27 who are exempt from the provisions of the state civil service law,
28 chapter 41.06 RCW;
29 (2) To make any contracts necessary or incidental to the
30 performance of its duties and the execution of its powers, including
31 contracts with public and private agencies, organizations,
32 corporations, and individuals, and to pay for services rendered or
33 furnished;
34 (3) To make such rules as are necessary to carry out its
35 responsibilities, including, without limitation, rules to ensure that
36 each panel and its panelists are able to carry out their
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1 responsibilities under this chapter in a manner that is fair and
2 impartial and is reasonably perceived to be fair and impartial;
3 (4) To lease, purchase or otherwise contract for the use ofreal or
4 personal property or any interest therein, as it finds necessary to
5 carry out the activities conducted under this chapter; and
6 (5) To do other acts and things necessary or convenient to execute
7 the authority expressly granted to it.
8 NEW SECTION. Sec. 4. CITIZENS PANELS. Beginning in 2008, a
9 citizens panel shall be convened not more than forty-five days after
10 the citizens initiative review commission receives a certificate of
11 sufficiency from the secretary of state regarding a statewide ballot
12 measure. One panel shall be convened for each measure so certified.
13 (1) Each citizens panel shall consist of twenty-four registered
14 Washington voters. The commission shall provide for alternate
15 panelists as it deems appropriate. The commission shall adopt rules
16 for selection of panelists that: (a) Provide for the anonymous
17 selection of panelists from a representative sample of Washington
18 voters, using survey sampling methods that, to the extent practicable,
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19 give every Washington voter a similar chance of being selected; and (b)
20 ensure, to the extent practicable and legally permissible, that the
21 demographic makeup of each panel fairly reflects the population of the
22 state as a whole, with respect to characteristics including but not
23 limited to age, education, and geographic location.
24 (2) The commission shall adopt such uniform rules regarding service
25 on a citizens panel as the commission deems appropriate in order to
26 keep the citizens panel process from being unduly influenced by persons
27 having special knowledge ofor a special interest in the ballot measure
28 being evaluated. These rules shall provide, as an example and not by
29 way oflimitation, that: (a) Persons who have made a contribution in
30 support of or in opposition to a ballot measure, or who receive
31 compensation for their efforts in support of or opposition to a ballot
32 measure, may not serve on a panel evaluating that measure; and (b)
33 persons who hold a statewide elective office or serve as a commissioner
34 on a state board or head of a state agency may not serve on any
35 citizens panel.
36 (3) Compensation shall be paid to each panelist per day served.
37 This per diem payment shall be calculated based on an eight-hour day
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1 paid at the mean hourly wage for all occupations as published in the
2 most recent Washington state occupational employment and wage estimates
3 using the occupational employment statistics data collected by the
4 United States department of labor's bureau of labor statistics. Each
5 panelist shall also be reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance
6 with reimbursement policies established by the commission.
7 (4) From the time of his or her appointment through the conclusion
8 of the citizens panel's activities, no panelist may at any time permit
9 his or her name to be used, or make any contribution, in support of or
10 opposition to any ballot measure reviewed by that panelist. Persons
11 serving on a citizens panel shall comply with the appearance of
12 fairness doctrine provisions as described in RCW 42.36.060,42.36.080,
13 and 42.36.090 as if the panelists were members of a decision-making
14 body in proceedings subject to that statute. However, neither the
15 appearance of fairness doctrine nor chapter 42.36 RCW may form the
16 basis of any challenge to any report submitted by a citizens panel. A
17 citizens panel is not an agency of the state, the commission, or any
18 other governmental body and is exempt from chapters 42.30 and 42.56
19 RCW.
20 NEW SECTION. Sec. 5. CITIZENS PANEL PROCESS; DISTRIBUTION OF
21 REPORTS. (1) Each citizens panel shall meet for five days, during
22 which time its activities shall be moderated by two moderators, chosen
23 in accordance with section 8 ofthis act, and supported by citizens
24 initiative review commission staff. Each panel shall conduct its
25 activities as follows:
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26 (a)(i) Each panel shall hold open public hearings, which may be
27 interspersed with the small group work sessions described under (b) of
28 this subsection. During these public hearings, a team of proponents
29 and a team of opponents, each identified pursuant to section 6(3) of
30 this act, shall be given equal time within which to present its
31 arguments and supporting information, including but not limited to
32 presentations given by persons of its choosing. The public hearings
33 shall also provide time for discussion among panelists and shall
34 provide the panelists with time to question the proponents' team, the
35 opponents' team, and any other person who has provided a presentation
36 to the panel.
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1 (ii) The office of financial management shall provide, at the
2 public hearings, an analysis ofthe fiscal impact ofthe measure
3 prepared pursuant to RCW 29A.72.025.
4 (iii) The commission shall adopt rules to permit the panelists, by
5 majority vote ofthe citizens panel, to request additional background
6 information or presentations to be provided in the public hearings.
7 Panelists shall be permitted to choose from sources identified by
8 commission staff, which include each person who has registered with the
9 commission as interested in providing information or a presentation,
10 and such additional persons or sources as may meet the criteria
11 established by the commission.
12 (b)(i) The panelists shall meet in small group work sessions, which
13 may be interspersed with the public hearings described under(a) of this
14 subsection. The work sessions shall be attended only by the panelists,
15 moderators, and commission staff.
16 (ii) A final report on the measure, as described in subsection (2)
17 of this section, shall be prepared in small group work sessions. A
18 report is final once each component has been submitted by its authors
19 as described in subsection (2) ofthis section. No final report or any
20 component is subject to revision by the panel as a whole, the
21 commission, or any other governmental body. No person has any right to
22 appeal or challenge a report or any component of a report except as
23 described in RCW 29A.32.090.
24 (c) The panel shall adjourn once the citizens panel report is final
25 and the panelists have chosen members to participate on an evaluation
26 panel as described in section 7 of this act.
27 (2) The report shall be prepared in a form provided by commission
28 staff, which includes the following:
29 (a) The ballot title and full text of the ballot measure;
30 (b) Position statements of not more than two hundred fifty words,
31 explaining the reasoning and position taken by the group ofpanelists
32 in favor ofthe measure, by those opposed to the measure, and by those
33 undecided on the measure. Each group shall author one position
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34 statement representing the consensus of that group. The position
35 statement shall identify the number of panelists taking that position,
36 and no position statement is required for a position if no panelists
37 take that position.
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1 (c) A panel consensus statement of not more than one hundred fifty
2 words explaining the points, if any, upon which all panelists agree;
3 (d) The following disclaimer: "The statements and opinions
4 expressed are those of the panel members, developed through the
5 citizens panel process. These are NOT official opinions or positions
6 endorsed by the state, the citizens initiative review commission, or
7 any government agency. The state is prohibited from editing or
8 redacting the content of these statements. A citizens panel is not a
9 judge ofthe constitutionality or legality of any ballot measure, and
10 any statements about such matters are not binding on any court of law."
11 (3) After each citizens panel report is final, the commission staff
12 shall:
13 (a) Within two business days, transmit to the secretary of state
14 for inclusion in the voters' pamphlet, in accordance with RCW
15 29A.32.070, the serial number identifying the ballot measure evaluated
16 and the information described in subsection (2)(b) through (d) of this
17 section; and
18 (b) Within fifteen business days, make available on a commission
19 web site the final report and such other information as the commission
20 may by general rule require.
21 NEW SECTION. Sec. 6. PROCEDURES FOR CITIZENS PANELS. (1) The
22 citizens initiative review commission shall adopt rules to ensure that
23 citizens panels are conducted in a fair and impartial manner,
24 including, at a minimum, provisions for the release of citizens panel
25 reports and media relations. To facilitate the process of convening
26 citizens panels in a timely manner, the rules may provide for panelist
27 selection and notification to begin before ballot measures are
28 certified. The rules must provide for instruction to panelists
29 regarding use of information gathered outside of the panel proceedings.
30 (2) No more than one week after receiving a certification under RCW
31 29A.72.250 or 29A.72.260, the commission must provide notice to the
32 sponsor of the ballot measure, to every person who has requested
33 notification of ballot title language under RCW 29A.72.070, to the
34 persons chosen to write arguments for the voters' pamphlet pursuant to
35 RCW 29A.32.060, and to any other person who makes written request to
36 the commission for such notification. This notice must include the
37 dates, time, and place ofthe hearings and must explain how to register
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1 to provide information or a presentation to the panel. Information
2 regarding the persons who so register will be provided to the citizens
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3 panel, and those persons may be called by the panel during the open
4 public hearings at the discretion of the panel. The notice shall
5 establish a deadline for registration that is two weeks prior to the
6 date the citizens panel is scheduled to convene.
7 (3)(a) The sponsor of a ballot measure, as registered with the
8 secretary of state, shall serve as the leader of a proponent team, who
9 shall be charged with providing to the citizens panel information and
10 presentations in favor of the ballot measure. In the case of a measure
11 referred or proposed by the legislature, the proponent team leader
12 shall be chosen from among those writing the voters' pamphlet statement
13 in favor of the measure in the same manner as the opponent team leader
14 is chosen in (b) of this subsection.
15 (b) The members ofthe committee chosen pursuant to RCW 29A.32.060
16 to prepare a statement for the voters' pamphlet in opposition to the
17 measure shall be notified of the opportunity to serve as leader of the
18 opponent team. If no individual from this group volunteers to serve,
19 or if more than one individual volunteers to serve, the commission
20 staff shall attempt to facilitate an agreement among those individuals
21 as to who should lead the team. Ifno decision can be reached among
22 the individuals, commission staff shall choose a team leader. No
23 person has the right to appeal or challenge the choice of team leader.
24 (4) Prior to the date that the citizens panel convenes, commission
25 staff must prepare an agenda for the citizens panel proceedings,
26 including the agendas or outlines submitted by each team, and send that
27 schedule to each panelist and to each person to whom notice was sent
28 under subsection (2) of this section.
29 NEW SECTION. Sec. 7. EVALUATION PROCEDURES. (1) The citizens
30 initiative review commission shall annually evaluate the conduct ofthe
31 citizens panels. To facilitate this evaluation, the commission shall,
32 after the statewide general election each year that a citizens panel
33 was convened:
34 (a) Conduct a statewide study ofWashington voters and collect
35 other data to determine the usefulness of the citizens panels and their
36 reports, the results of which must be made public; and
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1 (b) Convene no later than February 1st ofthe following year, an
2 evaluation panel in accordance with subsection (2) of this section, and
3 a moderator panel in accordance with subsection (3) of this section.
4 (2)(a) Prior to convening the first citizens panel in a calendar
5 year, the executive director, or in the absence of an executive
6 director the commission, shall choose the number of citizen panelists
7 that comprise the evaluation panel. The number chosen must be between
8 eight and eighteen and must be based on the number of expected ballot
9 measures, so that each citizens panel elects, pursuant to section
10 5(1)(c) of this act, an equal number of its members to serve on the
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11 evaluation panel.
12 (b) The evaluation panel shall meet for not more than three days to
13 conduct its review. The evaluation panel shall submit a report and may
14 make recommendations to the commission on all procedural aspects of the
15 citizens panel proceedings.
16 (c) Panelists serving on the evaluation panel shall be compensated
17 for their attendance at evaluation panel meetings and reimbursed for
18 their travel expenses in the same manner as citizen panelists under
19 section 4(3) of this act.
20 (d) The evaluation panel shall choose two of its members to serve
21 on the commission for a three-year term, in accordance with section 2
22 of this act.
23 (3) In each year in which a citizens panel is convened, the
24 commission shall convene a panel of moderators to meet no later than
25 February 1st ofthe following year.
26 (a) The panel of moderators shall consist of all those who served
27 as moderators of the citizens panels for the most recent election
28 cycle.
29 (b) The panel of moderators shall meet for one or two days to
30 conduct its review. They shall submit a report and may make
31 recommendations to the commission on all procedural aspects of the
32 citizens panel proceedings.
33 (c) Panelists shall be compensated for their attendance at
34 moderator panel meetings at the same daily rate they were paid as
35 moderators of the citizens panels, and reimbursed for their travel
36 expenses in the same manner as citizen panelists under section 4(3) of
37 this act.
p. 9 HB 1696
1 (d) The panel of moderators shall choose one of its members to
2 serve on the commission for a three-year term, in accordance with
3 section 2 of this act.
4 NEW SECTION. Sec. 8. CITIZENS' PANEL MODERATORS. (1) The
5 citizens initiative review commission shall establish minimum
6 qualifications for citizens panel moderators, including but not limited
7 to: (a) Minimum levels of experience in facilitation or mediation and
8 completion of at least two days of training specifically designed for
9 moderators of citizens panels under this chapter; and (b) such
10 additional qualifications as the commission deems appropriate in order
11 to ensure that the citizens panel process is conducted in a fair and
12 impartial manner.
13 (2) The commission shall request the qualifications of potential
14 moderators and shall designate a pool of moderators. The commission
15 shall contract with two moderators for each citizens panel to be
16 convened. The contract for services shall cover compensation for the
17 moderators for their services in preparation for a citizens panel,
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18 moderating a citizens panel, and participating on the subsequent panel
19 of moderators.
20 (3) No moderator may at any time permit his or her name to be used,
21 or make any contribution, in support of or opposition to the ballot
22 measure reviewed by the citizens panel he or she is involved with
23 moderating.
24 Sec. 9. RCW 29A.32.070 and 2003 c 111 s 807 are each amended to
25 read as follows:
26 The secretary of state shall determine the format and layout of the
27 voters' pamphlet. The secretary of state shall print the pamphlet in
28 clear, readable type on a size, quality, and weight of paper that in
29 the judgment of the secretary of state best serves the voters. The
30 pamphlet must contain a table of contents. Federal and state offices
31 must appear in the pamphlet in the same sequence as they appear on the
32 ballot. Measures and arguments must be printed in the order specified
33 by RCW 29A.72.290.
34 The voters' pamphlet must provide the following information for
35 each statewide issue on the ballot:
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1 (1) The legal identification ofthe measure by serial designation
2 or number;
3 (2) The official ballot title of the measure;
4 (3) A statement prepared by the attorney general explaining the law
5 as it presently exists;
6 (4) A statement prepared by the attorney general explaining the
7 effect of the proposed measure if it becomes law;
8 (5) The fiscal impact statement prepared under RCW ((29.79.075))
929A.72.025;
10 (6) The total number of votes cast for and against the measure in
11 the senate and house of representatives, if the measure has been passed
12 by the legislature;
13 (7) An argument advocating the voters' approval of the measure
14 together with any statement in rebuttal of the opposing argument;
15 (8) An argument advocating the voters' rejection ofthe measure
16 together with any statement in rebuttal of the opposing argument;
17 (9) Each argument or rebuttal statement must be followed by the
18 names of the committee members who submitted them, and may be followed
19 by a telephone number that citizens may call to obtain information on
20 the ballot measure;
21 (10) The information received from the citizens initiative review
22 commission under section 5(3)(a) ofthis act; and
23 (11) The full text of each measure.
24 Sec. 10. RCW 29A.72.250 and 2003 c 111 s 1825 are each amended to
25 read as follows:
26 If a referendum or initiative petition for submission of a measure
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27 to the people is found sufficient, the secretary of state shall:
28 (1) Immediately upon each such finding of sufficiency, provide to
29 the citizens initiative review commission, created under section 2 of
30 this act, the serial number and ballot title ofthat ballot measure;
31 and
32 (2) At the time and in the manner that he or she certifies to the
33 county auditors ofthe various counties the names of candidates for
34 state and district officers certify to each county auditor the serial
35 numbers and ballot titles ofthe several initiative and referendum
36 measures to be voted upon at the next ensuing general election or
37 special election ordered by the legislature.
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1 Sec. 11. RCW 29A.72.260 and 2003 c 111 s 1826 are each amended to
2 read as follows:
3 Whenever any measure proposed by initiative petition for submission
4 to the legislature is rejected by the legislature or the legislature
5 takes no action thereon before the end of the regular session at which
6 it is submitted, the secretary of state shall certify the serial number
7 and ballot title thereof to the citizens initiative review commission
8 created under section 2 of this act and to the county auditors for
9 printing on the ballots at the next ensuing general election in like
10 manner as initiative measures for submission to the people are
11 certified.
12 NEW SECTION. Sec. 12. APPOINTMENT OF INITIAL BOARD OF
13 COMMISSIONERS. The initial commissioners shall be appointed and serve
14 as follows:
15 (1) The governor, the secretary of state, and the attorney general
16 shall each appoint one commissioner. These commissioners shall be
17 randomly assigned to a one, two, or three-year term.
18 (2) The three initial commissioners occupying the moderators' seats
19 shall be appointed by the governor, the secretary of state, and the
20 attorney general, choosing from a list of trained moderators that has
21 been provided by a nonprofit organization registered under section
22 501(c)(3) of the internal revenue code that has conducted pilot
23 projects in Washington state using methods similar to the citizens
24 panel review process, which pilot projects have drawn together
25 microcosms of the public for meetings lasting for more than one full
26 day. If more than one organization meeting these criteria provides a
27 list, the first three commissioners shall choose which list to use.
28 The commissioners appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be
29 randomly assigned to a one, two, or three-year term.
30 (3) Ofthe six citizen panelist seats, only four shall be filled
31 initially. The majority and minority leaders ofthe house of
32 representatives and senate shall each appoint one of the commissioners
33 from a list ofpersons provided by the nonprofit organization described
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34 in subsection (2) of this section. Each of these initial commissioners
35 shall be assigned to a two or three-year term, so that two seats expire
36 in each year. The remaining two citizen panelist seats shall be filled
37 by individuals chosen by the first evaluation panel.
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1 NEW SECTION. Sec. 13. CODIFICATION. Sections 1 through 8 and 12
2 of this act constitute a new chapter in Title 29A RCW.
3 NEW SECTION. Sec. 14. CAPTIONS. Captions used in this act are
4 not any part of the law.
5 NEW SECTION. Sec. 15. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this act
6 or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
7 remainder ofthe act or the application of the provision to other
8 persons or circumstances is not affected.
--- END ---
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LC 3096
House Bi1l29ll
Sponsored by Representative BUCKLEY
SUMMARY
The following summary is not prepared by the sponsors of the
measure and is not a part of the body thereof subject to
consideration by the Legislative Assembly. It is an editor's
brief statement of the essential features of the measure as
introduced.
Creates Citizen Initiative Review Commission to oversee review
of state initiative measures by citizen review panels. Directs
panels to review state initiative measures and prepare final
report consisting of positions statements of members of panel who
support or oppose measure and consensus statement. Directs
Secretary of State to print statements in voters' pamphlet.
Specifies procedures for appointment of commission, panels and
moderators of panels. Sets terms of office.
Declares emergency, effective on passage.
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A BILL FOR AN ACT
Relating to elections; creating new provisions; amending ORS
251.185; and declaring an emergency.
The Legislative Assembly affirms this state's long-standing
policy of promoting informed public discussion and understanding
of state initiative measures and declares that it is in the best
interests ofthe state that an independent and impartial analysis
of those measures be made available to voters so that voters may
thoughtfully evaluate the measures. In support ofthese
declarations, the Legislative Assembly finds:
(1) Section 1, Article IV, Oregon Constitution, reserves the
right of the people to propose laws and amendments to the
Constitution through the initiative and referendum processes.
(2) It is the long-standing policy of this state and an
underlying premise of democratic government that informed public
discussion will enhance the direct legislation process. This is
supported by recent studies and surveys presented to the
Legislative Assembly suggesting that review by an independent and
impartial panel of Oregon voters would lead to better, more
informed public discussion and would enhance the direct
legislation process.
(3) The most effective way to make available this type of
independent and impartial information is for the state to convene
panels of voters, demographically representative of the state as
a whole, who will study and evaluate state initiative measures
through a quasi-legislative hearing process, and to include the
findings of the panels in the state voters' pamphlet.
Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
SECTION 1. {+ Sections 2 to 8 of this 2007 Act are added to
and made a part of ORS chapter 250. + }
SECTION 2. {+ (1) The Citizen Initiative Review Commission is
created as an independent commission within the legislative
branch of government. The purpose of the commission is to ensure
that:
(a) Citizen panels are convened as specified in sections 2 to 8
of this 2007 Act;
(b) The activities of the citizen panels are conducted in a
fair and impartial manner;
(c) The funds appropriated to the commission are spent
efficiently and effectively; and
(d) Appropriate training is provided to the citizen panels, the
panel moderators and commission staff.
(2) The commission shall consist of 12 commissioners appointed
to serve as follows:
(a) The Governor, the Attorney General and the Secretary of
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State shall each appoint one commissioner.
(b) Six commissioners shall be chosen by the evaluation panels
from among the former citizen panelists, in accordance with
section 7 of this 2007 Act.
(c) Three commissioners shall be chosen by the moderator panel
from among former moderators in accordance with section 7 of this
2007 Act. The terms of the commissioners shall be staggered so
that the terms of four commissioners expire each year.
(3) The term of office of a commissioner is three years.
(4) Each commissioner must be an elector. A commissioner may
not serve in any elected public office while serving on the
commission.
(5) The term of office of a commissioner begins on January
1. Each commissioner shall serve until a successor is appointed
and takes office. Vacancies shall be filled by appointment in the
same manner as for the commissioner whose position is vacant. A
vacancy shall be filled for the unexpired term. Commissioners may
not be appointed to successive terms, except that if a
commissioner is appointed to fill an unexpired term of two or
fewer years, the commissioner may be appointed to an additional
term.
(6) A commissioner may not permit the name of the commissioner
to be used, or make any campaign contribution, to support or
oppose a state initiative measure.
(7) The commission shall meet at least three times per year and
may appoint its own chairperson, vice chairperson and other
officers and committees as determined by the commission.
(8) Commissioners shall receive compensation for attendance at
commission meetings and be reimbursed for travel expenses related
to attendance at those meetings in the same manner as citizen
panelists under section 4 of this 2007 Act. + }
SECTION 3. {+ The Citizen Initiative Review Commission has
the following powers:
(1) To select and employ an executive director and any
research, technical or clerical personnel and consultants as the
commission considers necessary. Persons described in this
subsection shall receive compensation in an amount set by the
commission and are exempt from the provisions of ORS chapters 240
and 243.
(2) To make any contracts necessary or incidental to the
performance of its duties and the execution of its powers,
including contracts with public and private agencies,
organizations, corporations and individuals, and to pay for
services rendered or furnished.
(3) To adopt rules necessary to carry out its responsibilities
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under sections 2 to 8 of this 2007 Act, including rules to ensure
that each citizen panel is able to carry out its responsibilities
under sections 2 to 8 of this 2007 Act in a manner that is fair
and impartial and that is reasonably perceived to be fair and
impartial.
(4) To lease, purchase or otherwise contract for the use of
real or personal property or any interest in real or personal
property.
(5) To perform the acts necessary to execute the authority
expressly granted to it. + }
SECTION 4. {+ (1) Not sooner than four months before the date
ofthe general election and not later than the 75th day before
the date of the general election, the Citizen Initiative Review
Commission shall convene a citizen panel for each state
initiative measure that has qualified for the general election
ballot under ORS 250.105.
(2) Each citizen panel shall consist of24 electors. The
commission shall provide for alternate panelists as it deems
appropriate. The commission shall adopt rules for selection of
panelists that:
(a) Provide for the anonymous selection of panelists from a
representative sample of electors, using survey sampling methods
that, to the extent practicable, give every elector a similar
chance of being selected; and
(b) Ensure, to the extent practicable and legally permissible,
that the demographic makeup of each citizen panel fairly reflects
the population of the state as a whole, with respect to
characteristics including, but not limited to, age, education and
geographic location.
(3) The commission shall adopt uniform rules regarding service
on a citizen panel that the commission considers necessary to
keep the citizen panel process from being unduly influenced by
persons having special knowledge of or a special interest in the
state initiative measure being considered by the panel. The rules
may include, but are not limited to, provisions that prohibit
service on a panel by a person who:
(a) Has made a contribution supporting or opposing an
initiative measure, or who has received compensation for
supporting or opposing an initiative measure; or
(b) Holds a statewide elected public office, serves as a
commissioner on a state board or is a director of a state agency.
(4) Compensation shall be paid to each citizen panelist for
each day served. This compensation shall be calculated based on
an eight-hour day paid at the average hourly wage for all
occupations as published in the most recent Oregon data published
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by the Economic and Community Development Department. Each
citizen panelist shall also be reimbursed for travel expenses in
accordance with reimbursement policies established by the
commission.
(5) From the time of appointment through the conclusion ofthe
citizen panel's activities, a citizen panelist may not permit the
citizen panelist's name to be used, or make any contribution, to
support or oppose an initiative measure reviewed by that citizen
panelist under sections 2 to 8 of this 2007 Act.
(6) A citizen panel is not subject to the public meetings
requirements ofORS 192.610 to 192.690.
(7) Except for the final report of a citizen panel described in
section 5 of this 2007 Act, the records of a citizen panel may
not be disclosed under ORS 192.410 to 192.505. + }
SECTION 5. {+ (1) Each citizen panel shall meet for five
days. The activities of each panel shall be moderated by two
moderators chosen in accordance with section 8 of this 2007 Act
and supported by the Citizen Initiative Review Commission staff.
(2) Each citizen panel shall hold not less than three days of
open public hearings. The public hearings may be interspersed
with the small group work sessions described in subsection (4) of
this section. During the public hearings, the citizen panel shall
give equal time to a team of proponents of the state initiative
measure and a team of opponents of the measure, each identified
pursuant to section 6 of this 2007 Act, to present arguments and
supporting information, including but not limited to
presentations given by persons of each team's choice. The citizen
panel shall also provide time for comments and questions by the
panelists.
(3) The commission shall adopt rules to permit a citizen panel
by majority vote to request that additional background
information or presentations be provided in the public
hearings. Citizen panelists may choose from:
(a) Sources identified by commission staff, including persons
who have notified the commission that they are interested in
providing information or a presentation; and
(b) Any additional persons or sources that meet criteria
established by the commission.
(4) A citizen panel shall meet in private small group work
sessions, which may be interspersed with the public hearings
described in subsections (2) and (3) of this section. The work
sessions may be attended only by the citizen panelists,
moderators and commission staff.
(5) Each citizen panel shall prepare and submit to the
commission a final report on the initiative measure it
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considered. A report is considered final once each component of
the report has been submitted as described in subsection (7) of
this section. A final report or any part of a final report is not
subject to revision by the citizen panel as a whole, the
commission or any other public body as defined in ORS 174.109. A
person may not appeal or challenge a final report or any part of
a final report.
(6) A citizen panel shall adjourn after the panel:
(a) Prepares a final report; and
(b) Chooses members to participate on an evaluation panel as
described in section 7 of this 2007 Act.
(7) The final report of a citizen panel shall be prepared in a
form set by commission staff. The final report shall include:
(a) The ballot title and full text ofthe initiative measure
reviewed by the citizen panel.
(b) Position statements of not more than 250 words explaining
the reasoning and position taken by the group of citizen
panelists in favor of the measure, by those opposed to the
measure and by those undecided on the measure. Each group shall
draft one position statement representing the consensus of that
group. Each position statement shall identify the number of
citizen panelists taking that position. A position statement is
not required for a position that is not supported by any member
of the citizen panel.
(c) A citizen panel consensus statement ofnot more than 150
words explaining the points, if any, upon which all panelists
agree.
(d) The following disclaimer: + }
{+ The statements and opinions expressed are those of the
citizen panel members and were developed through the citizen
panel process. These are NOT official opinions or positions
endorsed by the State of Oregon, the Citizen Initiative Review
Commission or any government agency. The state is prohibited from
editing the content of these statements. A citizen panel is not a
judge of the constitutionality or legality of any ballot measure
and any statements about such matters are not binding on any
court of law. + }
{+ (8) After a citizen panel report is final, the commission
staff shall :
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(a) Within two business days, and not later than the 70th day
before the election, transmit the report to the Secretary of
State for inclusion in the voters' pamphlet. The voters' pamphlet
shall include those elements ofthe report described in
subsection (7)(b), (c) and (d) ofthis section; and
(b) Not later than the 60th day before the election, make
available on the commission website the final report and any
other information the commission considers necessary. + }
SECTION 6. {+ (1) The Citizen Initiative Review Commission
shall adopt rules to ensure that the activities of the citizen
panels are conducted in a fair and impartial manner. The rules
shall include:
(a) Provisions for the release of citizen panel reports and
media relations;
(b) Provisions allowing citizen panelist selection and
notification to begin before initiative measures are certified to
the ballot by the Secretary of State; and
(c) Provisions for instruction to citizen panelists regarding
use of information gathered outside of the citizen panels'
proceedings.
(2)(a) The Secretary of State shall notify the commission upon
receiving an initiative petition for signature verification. The
commission shall provide notice to any person who makes written
request to the commission for the notice and shall provide
reasonable statewide notice of the establishment of a citizen
panel.
(b) Each notice given by the commission under this section must
include the date, time and place of each citizen panel hearing
and must explain how to register to provide information or a
presentation to the citizen panel. The commission shall provide
to the citizen panel any information regarding the persons who
register. Each notice shall establish a deadline for registration
that is at least two weeks prior to the date the citizen panel is
scheduled to convene.
(3)(a) The chief petitioners of an initiative measure shall
select two persons to a team to provide information and
presentations in favor ofthe measure to the citizen panel. If
the proponents fail to timely select two team leaders, the
commission, by procedures established by rule, may designate the
team in favor of the measure.
(b) The commission shall establish by rule procedures for
selecting opponents of the measure to a team to provide
information and presentations in opposition to the measure. The
commission shall notify each member of the committee chosen under
ORS 251.205 as an opponent of the measure of the opportunity to
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serve as leader of the opponent team. If no individual from the
opponents selected under ORS 251.205 volunteers to serve, or if
more than one individual volunteers to serve, the commission
staff shall attempt to facilitate an agreement among those
individuals as to who should lead the team. If no decision can be
reached among the individuals, commission staff shall choose a
team leader.
(4) A person may not appeal or challenge the choice oftearn
leader.
(5) Prior to the date that the citizen panel convenes,
commission staff shall prepare an agenda for the citizen panel
proceedings, including the agendas or outlines submitted by each
team, and send that schedule to each citizen panelist and to each
person to whom notice was sent under subsection (2) of this
section. + }
SECTION 7. {+ (1) The Citizen Initiative Review Commission
shall evaluate the conduct of the citizen panels. After the
general election in each year that a citizen panel was convened,
the commission shall:
(a) Conduct a statewide study of electors and collect other
data to determine the usefulness of the citizen panels and their
reports;
(b) Make the results of the study available to the public; and
(c) Convene, not later than February 1 of the following year,
an evaluation panel in accordance with subsection (2) of this
section and a moderator panel in accordance with subsection (3)
of this section.
(2)(a) Prior to convening the first citizen panel in a calendar
year, the executive director of the commission or, in the absence
of an executive director, the commission shall select the number
of citizen panelists who will constitute the evaluation panel.
The number appointed must be no fewer than eight and no more than
18 and must be based on the number of expected state initiative
measures, so that each citizen panel elects an equal number of
its members to serve on the evaluation panel.
(b) The evaluation panel shall meet for not more than three
days to conduct its review. The evaluation panel shall submit a
written report and may make recommendations to the commission on
all procedural aspects of the citizen panel proceedings.
(c) Panelists serving on the evaluation panel shall be
compensated for their attendance at evaluation panel meetings and
reimbursed for their travel expenses in the same manner as
citizen panelists under section 4 of this 2007 Act.
(d) The evaluation panel shall choose two of its members to
serve on the commission for a three-year term, in accordance with
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section 2 of this 2007 Act.
(3)(a) In each year in which a citizen panel is convened, the
commission shall convene a moderator panel to meet no later than
February 1 of the following year.
(b) The moderator panel shall consist of all persons who served
as moderators of the citizen panels for the most recent election
cycle.
(c) The moderator panel shall meet for not more than two days
to conduct its review. The moderator panel shall submit a written
report and may make recommendations to the commission on all
procedural aspects of the citizen panel proceedings.
(d) Panelists serving on the moderator panel shall be
compensated for their attendance at moderator panel meetings at
the same daily rate they were paid as moderators ofthe citizen
panels and reimbursed for their travel expenses in the same
manner as citizen panelists under section 4 of this 2007 Act.
(e) The moderator panel shall choose one of its members to
serve on the commission for a three-year term, in accordance with
section 2 of this 2007 Act. + }
SECTION 8. {+ (1) The Citizen Initiative Review Commission
shall establish minimum qualifications for citizen panel
moderators, including but not limited to:
(a) Minimum levels of experience in facilitation or mediation
and completion of at least two days of training specifically
designed for moderators of citizen panels under this chapter; and
(b) Any additional qualifications the commission considers
appropriate in order to ensure that the citizen panel process is
conducted in a fair and impartial manner.
(2) The commission shall request and evaluate the
qualifications ofpotential moderators and shall designate a pool
ofmoderators. The commission shall contract with two moderators
for each citizen panel to be convened. Each contract for services
shall provide for the compensation of the moderator for services
in preparation for a citizen panel, moderating a citizen panel,
and participating on the subsequent moderator panel.
(3) A moderator may not at any time permit the name ofthe
moderator to be used, or make any contribution, in supporting or
opposing the state initiative measure reviewed by the citizen
panel served by the moderator. + }
SECTION 9. ORS 251.185 is amended to read:
251.185. (1) The Secretary of State shall have printed in the
voters' pamphlet for a general election or any special election a
copy of the title and text of each state measure to be submitted
to the people at the election for which the pamphlet was
prepared. Each measure shall be printed in the pamphlet with:
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(a) The number and ballot title ofthe measure;
(b) The financial estimates and any statement prepared for the
measure under ORS 250.125;
(c) The explanatory statement prepared for the measure { +
under ORS 251.215, 251.225 or 251.235 +}; {- and - }
{+ (d) The information received from the Citizen Initiative
Review Commission under section 5 of this 2007 Act; and + }
{ - (d) -} {+ (e) + } Arguments relating to the measure
and filed with the Secretary of State.
(2) A county measure or measure of a metropolitan service
district organized under ORS chapter 268, and ballot title,
explanatory statement and arguments relating to the measure,
filed by the county or metropolitan service district under ORS
251.285 shall be included in the voters' pamphlet described in
subsection (1) of this section if required under ORS 251.067.
SECTION 10. {+ Notwithstanding section 2 ofthis 2007 Act,
the first members appointed to the Citizen Initiative Review
Commission shall be appointed and serve as follows:
(1) The Governor, the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General shall each appoint one commissioner. The Governor, the
secretary and the Attorney General shall determine at random
which member serves for a term of one year, a term of two years
and a term of three years.
(2) The Governor, the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General shall appoint the three initial commissioners occupying
the moderator positions on the commission. The appointing
authorities shall choose from a list of trained moderators
suggested to the appointing authorities by any nonprofit
organization registered under section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code that has conducted pilot projects in this state
using methods similar to the citizen panel review process. If
more than one organization meeting these criteria provides a
list, the commissioners appointed under subsection (1) of this
section shall choose which list to use. The Governor, the
secretary and the Attorney General shall determine at random
which member serves for a term of one year, a term of two years
and a term of three years.
(3) For purposes of the first appointment of members of the
commission, only four of the six citizen panelist positions shall
be filled. The majority and minority leaders ofthe Senate and
the House of Representatives shall each appoint one of the
commissioners from a list of persons provided by the nonprofit
organization described in subsection (2) of this section. Each of
these initial commissioners shall be assigned to a two or
three-year term, so that two seats expire in each year. The
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remaining two citizen panelist seats shall be filled by
individuals chosen by the first evaluation panel. + }
SECTION 11. {+ This 2007 Act being necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, an
emergency is declared to exist, and this 2007 Act takes effect on
its passage. + }
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APPENDIXC
OREGON'S HOUSE BILL 2895
75th OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY--2009 Regular Session
Enrolled
House Bill 2895
Sponsored by Representatives CANNON, HARKER, SenatorWHITSETI; Representatives BAILEY,
BUCKLEY, CLEM, D EDWARDS, GARRARD, GARRETI, GREENLlCK, KOMP, NATHANSON,
OLSON, SCHAUFLER, SHIELDS, J SMITH, VANORMAN, WITI, Senators BURDICK,
DEVLIN, DINGFELDER, MONNES ANDERSON, MONROE, MORRISETIE, MORSE, WALKER
CHAPTER .
AN ACT
Relating to state measures; and declaring an emergency.
Whereas the people of Oregon support the initiative process as a means for Oregon residents
to propose laws and enact or reject the laws at an election independent of the Legislative Assembly;
and
Whereas informed public discussion and exercise of the initiative power will be enhanced by
review of statewide measures by an independent panel of Oregon voters who will then report to the
electorate in the voters' pamphlet; and
Whereas a provisional Citizen Initiative Review took place in September 2008 and demonstrated
the review process to be fair; now, therefore,
Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
SECTION 1. (1) The Secretary of State shall designate one or more organizations to work
cooperatively to establish citizen panels to review not more than three initiated state measures
and file with the secretary Citizen Statements on each measure reviewed to be included
in the voters' pamphlet. An organization is eligible to be designated under this section if the
organization ensures all of the following:
(a) The selection of citizens for each panel from a representative sample of anonymous
electors, using survey sampling methods that, to the extent practicable, give every elector
a similar chance of being selected.
(b) To the extent practicable and legally permissible, that the demographic makeup of
each panel fairly reflects the population of the electorate of this state as a whole, with respect
to the following characteristics, prioritized in the following order:
(A) The location of the elector's residence.
(B) The elector's party affiliation, if any.
(C) The elector's voting history.
(0) The elector's age.
(c) That the organization will:
(A) Compensate each elector for each day served on a panel in an amount calculated
using the average weekly wage as defined in ORS 656.211;
(B) Reimburse each elector who serves on a panel for travel expenses in accordance with
the reimbursement policies of the organization; and
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(C) Provide for any and all other costs required to convene and conduct a citizen panel
and for any costs associated with printing the statements in the voters' pamphlet.
(d) That a study will be conducted to evaluate the usefulness of the panels established
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by the organization and that the results will be made available to the public.
(e) That the organization has staff with prior experience in conducting substantially
similar reviews.
(f) That the organization does not and will not receive any funds, directly or indirectly,
from a political committee, as defined in ORS 260.005, or corporate or union treasuries.
(g) That each panel is moderated by two professional mediators or facilitators who have
been trained to conduct citizen review panels.
(2) An organization designated under this section shall convene a separate citizen panel
of not less than 18 and not more than 24 electors for each measure to be reviewed. A panel
shall meet to review the measure on five consecutive days for a total of not less than 25
hours. The organization shall make reasonable efforts to provide each panel with any complaints
filed regarding the measure reviewed by the panel not later than the fourth day the
panel convenes.
(3)(a) Notwithstanding ORS 251.185, a citizen panel may prepare and file with the Secretary
of State, and the secretary shall have printed in the voters' pamphlet, not more than
four Citizen Statements for each initiated state measure considered by the panel. The panel
may submit the following statements of not more than 150 words each:
(A) A Citizen Statement in favor of the measure.
(8) A Citizen Statement opposed to the measure.
(C) A Citizen Statement that is neither in favor of nor opposed to the measure.
(0) A Citizen Statement that reflects the views regarding the measure of more than a
majority of the panel.
(b) A citizen panel must file with the Secretary of State any Citizen Statements prepared
under this section not later than 70 days before the date of the election for which the voters'
pamphlet is being prepared.
(c) If a Citizen Statement on a measure is included in the voters' pamphlet, the secretary
shall provide with the statement a description of not more than 150 words of the citizen
panel process described in this section and the following explanation:
The opinions expressed in this statement are those of the members of a citizen panel and
were developed through the citizen review process. They are NOT official opinions or positions
endorsed by the State of Oregon or any government agency. A citizen panel is not a
jUdge of the constitutionality or legality of any ballot measure, and any statements about
such matters are not binding on a court of law.
SECTION 2. This 2009 Act is repealed on January 2, 2011.
SECTION 3. This 2009 Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health and safety, an emergency is declared to exist, and this 2009 Act takes effect
on its passage.
Enrolled House Bill 2895 (HB 2895-A)
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